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ABSTRACT 
In contests about pregnancy discrimination during the 1970s, feminists, 
the business lobby, and anti-abortion activists disputed the meaning of sex 
equality. Existing scholarship has yet to take account of the dynamic 
interaction between these groups. This Article fills that void by analyzing 
the legal and political debates that resulted in the passage of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”). The Article reveals how 
competing ideas about the family, wage work, and reproductive choice 
shaped the evolution of pregnancy discrimination law. Feminists, the 
business lobby, and anti-abortion activists drew upon two legal discourses 
in debating pregnancy discrimination: liberal individualism and 
“neomaternalism.” Each of these discourses, in turn, encompassed dual 
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valences. Liberal individualist discourse challenged sex-role stereotypes, 
but it also reinforced the idea that private reproductive choice rendered 
reproduction a private economic responsibility. Neomaternalism 
leveraged the social value of motherhood to gain entitlements for pregnant 
women, but also reinforced the normative primacy of motherhood.   
Feminists’ legal goals and rhetorical frames at times overlapped with 
and at other times diverged from those of both the business lobby and anti-
abortion activists. Feminists used liberal individualist principles of equal 
treatment and neutrality to challenge gender stereotypes that states and 
employers used to justify the exclusion of pregnancy from public and 
private insurance schemes. The business lobby used liberal individualist 
principles of private choice to advance a market libertarian interpretation 
of sex equality that justified the denial of pregnancy-related benefits. In 
opposition to the business lobby, both feminists and anti-abortion activists 
forged a fragile alliance. Both groups made neomaternal arguments in 
advocating the PDA. While feminists emphasized the value of pregnancy 
as a form of socially productive labor, however, anti-abortion activists 
stressed the need to protect pregnant women and fetuses.  
The points of confluence and departure between the arguments of 
feminists, business opponents, and anti-abortion allies both advanced sex 
equality under the law and also limited its scope. Feminist advocates for 
the PDA synthesized liberal individualist and neomaternal discourses to 
pursue the elimination of sex-role stereotypes under the law as well as 
collective societal responsibility for the costs of reproduction. While the 
PDA took a significant step toward the realization of this vision, it remains 
illusory. Our legal culture evolved to embrace not only the valences of 
liberal individualist and maternalist ideologies that advance sex equality 
but also those valences that reinforce gender inequality. Market 
libertarianism continues to privatize the costs of reproduction, while 
maternalism reinforces the sexual division of reproductive labor. 
Ultimately, this Article points to the persistence of tensions in the 
definition of sex equality and the consequent need for new legal 
paradigms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In contests about pregnancy discrimination during the 1970s, feminists, 
the business lobby, and anti-abortion activists disputed the meaning of sex 
equality. Existing scholarship has yet to take account of the dynamic 
interaction between these groups. This Article fills that void by analyzing 
the legal and political debates that resulted in the passage of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”).1 For all sides in these debates, the 
definition of sex equality was contingent and dynamic rather than 
transcendent and static. Feminists’ legal goals and rhetorical frames at 
times overlapped with and at other times diverged from those of both the 
business lobby and anti-abortion activists. These points of confluence and 
departure advanced sex equality under the law but also limited its scope.  
Feminists, the business lobby, and anti-abortion activists drew upon 
two legal discourses in debating pregnancy discrimination: liberal 
individualism and what I call “neomaternalism.” Liberal individualism 
emphasized principles of same treatment, private choice, and neutrality 
under law. This Article is the first piece of scholarship to identify and 
analyze neomaternalism, a form of advocacy in the 1970s that leveraged 
the social value of motherhood to lay claim to state entitlements for 
pregnant workers. Neomaternal advocacy modernized progressive and 
New Deal era maternalist reform traditions, which had mobilized 
conceptions of reproductive sex difference, maternal nurture, and 
motherhood’s social value to argue for protective labor standards for 
women workers and social-welfare entitlements protecting low-income 
women and children. By contrast with this earlier form of maternalist 
advocacy, which had reinforced the family-wage ideal, the neomaternal 
advocacy of the 1970s promoted equal employment opportunity for 
women. Neomaternal advocacy used an older rhetoric—that motherhood 
constituted a service to society—to advance a new legal ideal affirmed 
pregnant women’s right to economic independence as well as security. 
The richer history provided in this Article challenges the conventional 
view that the PDA marked the apex of a transformation from the 
protection of women to sex equality. The dominant narrative takes two 
forms. Some scholars argue that the PDA marked a turn in American law 
from special treatment for women to same treatment of women and men.
2
 
 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) 
(2006)). 
 2. See, e.g., LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE 
(1993) (depicting debates over the legal regulation of pregnant workers as contests between advocates 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
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More recent scholarship characterizes the PDA as a triumph of feminists’ 
efforts to challenge sex-role stereotypes under the law.
3
 This Article’s 
historical analysis illustrates how both forms of the dominant narrative 
overlook the complex, surprising, and nuanced evolution of the meaning 
of sex equality during the 1970s. In particular, the dominant narrative 
overlooks the ways in which neomaternalism as well as liberal 
individualism shaped the debates leading to the PDA.  
Neither liberal individualism nor neomaternalism captured the entirety 
of feminists’ legal agenda. Rather each form of discourse posed specific 
benefits and risks. Feminists marshaled liberal individualist principles to 
challenge the sex-role stereotypes that state governments and employers 
used to rationalize the exclusion of pregnancy from public and private 
insurance plans. By contrast, the business lobby deployed liberal 
individualist discourse to legitimate concepts of free contract and private 
ordering that reinforced gender- and race-based status hierarchies.
4
 Liberal 
 
 
of equal treatment and different treatment). The argument that the PDA represents a triumph for same 
treatment forms part of a larger narrative about feminist legal advocacy in the period. See Mary 
Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and 
Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209 (1998) (arguing that feminism in the 1960s and 1970s shifted 
wholly from protection to a formalist conception of equal treatment); Nicholas Pedriana, From 
Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and the Transformation of the Women’s 
Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718 (2006) (arguing that in the late 1960s the women’s 
movement shifted its legal framing from protection to equality).  
 3. Sophisticated recent scholarship enriches our historical understanding by showing that 1970s 
feminist legal activists did not reject sex-based classifications per se. In lieu of formal equality—same 
treatment for similarly situated individuals—feminist attorneys and activists sought to reform laws that 
entrenched sex-role stereotypes. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional 
Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 125–32 (2010) (arguing that feminist lawyers sought 
to extend the anti-stereotyping principle to the legal regulation of reproduction and pregnant workers 
but that the Supreme Court rejected this application); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by 
Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 
771 (2010) (arguing that Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s brief in the case of Struck v. Secretary of Defense 
challenging the exclusion of a pregnant woman from the military illustrated Ginsburg’s commitment to 
anti-subordination values). The literature on anti-stereotyping suggests that the PDA marks a key 
moment in which Congress not only embraced equal treatment but also used law to challenge 
traditional gender norms. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex 
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1358–67 (2012) (arguing that the PDA rejected the narrow, 
anti-classificationist interpretation of sex equality that the Supreme Court had invented in the 1976 
case of Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert). 
 4. Historians show that liberalism’s promise of free contract, free labor, and equal treatment 
under law simultaneously concealed and reinforced economic inequality and social status hierarchies. 
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 460–
99 (1988) (arguing that liberal ideology limited the promise of Reconstruction in the North); AMY DRU 
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE 
OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998) (analyzing the paradoxes presented by “freedom of contract” 
ideology at the moment of slave emancipation). For a theoretical discussion of the ways in which 
liberalism rests on the subordination of women within the family, see CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL 
CONTRACT (1988) (arguing that contract theory cannot advance feminist politics).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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individualism thus held the potential to challenge the ways in which law 
entrenched the family-wage ideal as well as the potential to mask 
workplace structures that perpetuated gender inequalities as sex neutral. 
Conversely, feminists and anti-abortion activists forged a tenuous 
alliance. Both groups drew upon neomaternal discourses to advocate the 
PDA. Anti-abortion activists argued for the protection of childbearing 
workers as a means to protect fetuses. They believed that prohibitions on 
pregnancy discrimination would increase women’s economic security and 
encourage them to bring their pregnancies to term rather than to abort. 
Feminists also made neomaternal arguments that stressed the societal 
value of childbearing. Rather than calling for the protection of women in 
their childbearing roles, however, feminists emphasized that childbearing 
constituted a form of labor deserving of public support. Neomaternalism 
helped to articulate the relationship between sex equality and the just 
distribution of the costs of reproduction. But neomaternalism also 
threatened to reinforce the normative primacy of motherhood. 
Feminists’ synthesis of liberal individualist and neomaternal discourses 
aspired to a vision of sex equality that would both transform gender roles 
and support women in their gendered roles as mothers. In combatting the 
exclusion of pregnancy from public and private insurance schemes, 
feminists challenged several gender stereotypes about men and women’s 
roles in the workplace and the family. The campaign for pregnancy 
disability and health insurance benefits, however, did more than challenge 
sex-role stereotypes. Feminists, advocating for pregnancy-related benefits, 
also took steps toward challenging what Martha Fineman has since 
theorized as the privatization of dependency.
5
 Unlike advocacy by welfare 
rights activists and socialist feminists on behalf of state support for 
mothering within the home, feminist advocacy for pregnancy 
discrimination law aimed to help women reconcile the role of mother and 
worker. While feminist campaigns against pregnancy discrimination did 
not seek to upend private responsibility for caregiving and for the 
derivative dependence of caregivers, this advocacy did seek collective, 
societal responsibility for the costs of reproduction. Feminist advocacy for 
pregnancy discrimination law challenged the allocation of the economic 
costs of pregnancy and childbirth—partial incapacity and lost productivity 
in the workplace, temporary physical dependence, and medical and 
healthcare costs—to the private family. Feminists’ vision for sex equality 
 
 
 5. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY xv 
(2004) (arguing for augmented state support of caregivers and children).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
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thus included at its core a claim about the just distribution of the costs of 
reproduction.
6
  
The PDA only partially institutionalized this vision. The PDA created a 
baseline requirement of equal treatment for pregnancy and temporary 
disabilities but did not create an affirmative entitlement to pregnancy-
related benefits. The statute thus spread the costs of reproduction among 
employers and workers but did not socialize the costs of reproduction or 
otherwise challenge the privatization of dependency. Moreover, the PDA 
advanced women’s affirmative right to bear children without sacrificing 
economic autonomy, but reinforced the status of abortion as a negative 
right that does not merit public economic support.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates the legal and political 
debates of the 1970s in the longer political economy of pregnancy 
discrimination. This Part revisits the historiography analyzing feminist, 
labor, and social-welfare activism in the progressive era and New Deal. It 
shows how reformers mobilized maternalist ideology as a jurisprudential 
and political tool to achieve protective labor regulations, first for women 
and later for both sexes. Yet policy actors and businesses designed state, 
social insurance programs and voluntary, employer, fringe benefits plans 
according to a masculine norm. Accordingly, benefits designed to promote 
the economic security of workers excluded pregnancy from coverage. 
Labor unions began to challenge these pregnancy exclusions after World 
War II. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, nascent sex discrimination 
doctrines invested workers and feminist attorneys with a new tool to 
demand coverage for pregnancy. 
 
 
 6. This Article does not argue that feminists advanced a comprehensive vision for distributive 
justice. Rather, it argues that feminists’ claim that the entire society should take responsibility for the 
costs of reproduction concerned the just distribution of economic benefits and burdens. The focus on 
distributive justice claims in feminist advocacy for sex equality under the law helps to remedy a gap in 
the historical literature. Legal historians have analyzed the place of distributive justice claims in the 
civil rights movement. Risa Goluboff, for example, recovers the legal strategy of the Department of 
Justice’s Civil Rights Section during the 1940s, which focused on Thirteenth Amendment claims 
rooted in the experience of African-American laborers. She argues that these claims held greater 
promise to combat the harms of Jim Crow for working-class blacks than did the NAACP’s strategy of 
using the Fourteenth Amendment to challenge segregation. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). Sophia Lee argues that African- American workers and attorneys challenged the 
state action doctrine through the 1950s; her research highlights the potential for equal protection to 
achieve economic security for African-American workers. SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE 
CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (forthcoming 2014). But the legal history of 
distributive justice claims made by the women’s liberation movement of the late 1960s and 1970s 
remains to be told. For an initial analysis of these claims, see Deborah Dinner, Pregnancy at Work: 
Sex Equality, Reproductive Liberty, and the Workplace, 1964–1993 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part II shows how the business lobby mobilized against pregnancy 
discrimination claims. Existing historical scholarship stresses social 
conservatives’ opposition to feminism, but pays insufficient attention to 
market conservative mobilization against feminists’ legal objectives.7 This 
Part helps to remedy that oversight by showing how the business lobby 
fused the concepts of reproductive privacy and choice with free-market 
economic principles to develop a market libertarian interpretation of sex 
equality. The business lobby’s arguments overlapped rhetorically with 
feminist arguments by drawing a distinction between sex and women’s 
reproductive role as mothers. Employers and business trade associations, 
however, also undermined feminist efforts to realize collective 
responsibility for the costs of reproduction. This Part examines the 
influence of the business lobby’s arguments on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
8
 and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 9
  
Part III examines the neomaternal politics of anti-abortion activists and 
analyzes how their advocacy influenced the passage of the PDA. Anti-
abortion activists opposed the liberal individualist principles that made 
terminating pregnancy a private choice and also made childbearing a 
private economic burden. They understood the legalization of abortion as a 
new imperative to obtain public support for motherhood. Neomaternal 
advocacy by anti-abortion activists, as well as feminists, helped to 
overcome the business lobby’s opposition to the PDA. Anti-abortion 
activists and Congressional members’ construction of the PDA as a pro-
life bill, however, also created the political space for the passage of an 
anti-abortion rider attached to the statute. The Beard Amendment to the 
PDA exempts employers from the obligation to provide equal health 
insurance coverage for abortion.
10
 The PDA thus bears the imprint of 
neomaternalism in a manner that highlights the risk of this form of 
argument to feminists. 
Part IV argues that the synthesis of liberal individualist and 
neomaternal ideals, which feminist advocates for the PDA pursued in the 
 
 
 7. The leading history of the 1970s, for example, while nuanced, nonetheless portrays social 
conservatives as feminists’ opponents while ignoring business conservatives’ opposition to feminists’ 
goals. See BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, THE SEVENTIES: THE GREAT SHIFT IN AMERICAN CULTURE, 
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS 159–89 (2001). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 10. An exception mandates equal health insurance coverage for abortion when abortion is 
necessary to save the life of the mother or gives rise to medical complications. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
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1970s, has since fractured. In the 1980s, feminists confronted the limits of 
the PDA in a conservative political environment that forced activists to 
prioritize either anti-stereotyping or equal employment opportunity for 
working-class women. Through the present day, courts interpret the PDA 
through a market libertarian lens that occludes the statute’s neomaternal 
potential. In conclusion, this Article examines the evolution of liberal 
individualism and maternalism at the close of the twentieth century and 
the start of the twenty-first century. It concludes that the evolution of these 
ideologies has compounded the difficulty of pursuing the elimination of 
sex-role stereotypes and, at the same time, collective responsibility for the 
costs of reproduction. 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION  
Part I places 1970s debates about pregnancy discrimination in their 
historical political economy. Part I.A describes how Lochner-era 
constitutional jurisprudence fostered a split within feminist legal 
advocacy. Feminists who prioritized protections for working-class women 
and allied progressive reformers used maternalism strategically to 
establish the constitutional authority of states to regulate the employment 
relationship. Other feminists who prioritized equal treatment under the law 
came to understand that goal as antithetical to sex-specific protective labor 
legislation. The political and constitutional landscape of the progressive 
era and 1920s thus catalyzed a tension between maternalism and liberal 
individualism within modern feminism.  
While protective labor regulation infringed on the private ordering of 
the labor market, the privatization of dependency persisted beyond the 
New Deal.
11
 Part I.B shows how a patchwork of insurance systems, which 
developed from the New Deal through the post-World War II period, 
excluded childbearing workers from coverage. Maternal ideologies 
provided a constitutional justification for protective labor legislation, but 
did not provide a rationale for the inclusion of pregnant women in the 
workplace and in employment benefits. The valorization of maternal 
nurture justified the protection of women as mothers, but not equal 
 
 
 11. A voluminous body of scholarship examines the gender ideologies embodied in a two-tier 
welfare system that channeled women and people of color disproportionately toward means- and 
morals-tested benefits administered at the state level and male breadwinners toward universal, higher-
quality entitlements administered at the federal level. See generally SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING 
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY xi–xii (1998); Barbara J. Nelson, 
The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen’s Compensation and Mothers’ Aid, in 
WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).  
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treatment for women as workers. The legal construction of women 
workers as mothers, first, and employees, second, undermined the 
economic security of childbearing workers. Policy actors as well as 
employers premised benefits on a masculine norm.
12
 Thus, even though 
women had formal equality of access to state and employer fringe benefits, 
the design of these benefits intensified the dependence of pregnant 
workers.  
By the 1970s, increased rates of women’s labor-market participation 
and rising rates of single motherhood deepened and broadened the 
injurious effect of these pregnancy exclusions. Part I.C discusses these 
trends and shows how labor activists and feminists used nascent sex 
equality doctrines under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause to claim 
the inclusion of coverage for pregnancy within state insurance programs 
and employer fringe benefit plans. Part I.D examines how employers used 
family-wage and separate-spheres ideologies to defend against equal 
coverage for pregnancy. By the early 1970s, however, these forms of 
arguments about gender were diminishing in legal and political potency. 
A. Liberal Individualism, Maternalism, and Labor Reform in the 
Progressive Era and New Deal 
During the progressive era, reformers used maternalist gender 
ideologies as a wedge with which to crack Lochnerism. Federal as well as 
state courts used freedom of contract and substantive due process 
doctrines to reject states’ authority under the police powers to enact labor 
regulations. Some feminist reformers and progressive allies turned to 
arguments about the need to protect women as a constitutional justification 
for labor regulations of women. They aspired to first win sex-specific 
protective laws for women and then to use this gain as a means to later 
expand protective labor regulations to men.
13
 The first triumph for these 
reformers came in 1908 when the Court decided Muller v. Oregon.
14
 Labor 
activist Josephine Goldmark and progressive lawyer Louis Brandeis 
teamed up to write the famous brief, packed with social scientific 
evidence, that helped persuade the Court to uphold a state maximum-hours 
 
 
 12. For a discussion of how a “gendered imagination” shaped the way in which policy actors 
designed social legislation, see ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND 
THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001). 
 13. See Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The Women’s Minimum Wage, the 
First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 
199 n.15 (1991). 
 14. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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law for women.
15
 The majority opinion in Muller cited gender ideologies 
about sex difference and women’s role to justify the state’s police power 
regulation.
16
 Muller represented the high watermark for maternalism in 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
The constitutional constraints of the period catalyzed a split among 
feminists.
17
 Activists who prioritized the protection of working-class 
women from exploitation continued to press for expansive labor 
regulations. Initially, feminist activists for the first Equal Rights 
Amendment believed that they could pursue sex-based protective 
legislation in conjunction with equal treatment under law. Over time, 
however, ERA activists came to understand sex-based protective laws as 
an injurious group classification of women that would undermine equal 
access to work opportunities.
18
 As historian Nancy Cott has argued, both 
supporters of protective legislation and ERA proponents saw themselves 
as legatees of nineteenth-century suffragists and as advocates for 
economic justice for women.
19
 Advocates for protective legislation were 
more pragmatic, taking the labor market as then structured; they 
understood women’s roles as mothers to be inherent. In contrast, 
proponents of the ERA were more aspirational, envisioning the labor 
market as it could be; they saw women’s reproductive roles as 
sociohistorical constructions.
20
  
Following Muller, constitutional jurisprudence swung temporarily back 
in the direction of liberal individualism. In the 1923 case of Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital,21 an employer challenged the District of Columbia’s 
minimum-wage law for women as a violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. The Adkins litigation generated an alliance 
between the National Woman’s Party, which opposed sex-specific 
protective laws because of their perceived conflict with the ERA, and 
businessmen who opposed the laws because they imposed heightened 
 
 
 15. Id. at 421–23. 
 16. The opinion reasoned “[t]hat woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal 
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence.” Id. at 421. The Court concluded 
that because “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman 
becomes an object of public interest.” Id.  
 17. For a discussion of the constitutional constraints facing reformers in the progressive era, see 
VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND THE MINIMUM WAGE 63–129 
(1994) (arguing that freedom of contract doctrine and a limited view of state authority under the police 
power forced advocates to tackle the minimum wage as a gender-specific problem). 
 18. Zimmerman, supra note 13.  
 19. NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 115–42 (1987). 
 20. See, e.g., id.  
 21. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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costs on employers.
22
 The Court in Adkins departed from the maternalism 
of Muller to strike down the minimum-wage law. The majority reasoned 
that having gained the right to vote with the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, women no longer needed the special protection of the state.
23
 
In addition, the Court reasoned that while a maximum-hours law had the 
clear purpose of preventing exploitation in the workplace, no similar 
protective justification existed for a minimum-wage law.
24
  
The case that marked the famous switch-in-time on the New Deal 
Court
25
 rested the New Deal’s constitutional authority on maternalist 
arguments about the protection of women. West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish
26
 reversed Adkins to uphold the state of Washington’s minimum-
wage law for women.
27
 The decision justified the law on the ground of a 
societal interest in the health of mothers
28
 as well as women’s unequal 
bargaining position in the labor market.
29
 West Coast Hotel represented 
the expansion of gendered ideologies about the need to protect women 
workers to universal ideologies about the need to regulate the market to 
correct power imbalances and protect all workers’ from exploitation.30 In 
the wake of the decision, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938.
31
 President Roosevelt used every political resource at his disposal to 
overcome opposition by southern conservatives who had long opposed a 
wages-and-hours bill. The Act contained forty-cent minimum wage and 
forty-hour maximum-hour provisions, but capitulated to white supremacy 
in the South by excluding domestic and agricultural workers.
32
  
 
 
 22. See Zimmerman, supra note 13, at 197–200.  
 23. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53.  
 24. Id. at 553–55.  
 25. For explanations of the Supreme Court’s capitulation to the New Deal, compare BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (offering an externalist account that 
emphasizes the Court-packing plan, popular electoral mobilization, and Congressional legislation) and 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995) (same) with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: 
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (offering an internalist account arguing 
that the New Deal represented the culmination of three decades’ doctrinal evolution). 
 26. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 27. Id. at 400 (overruling Adkins). 
 28. Id. at 398 (“What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and their 
protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers?”). 
 29. Id. at 399. 
 30. See JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW, AND 
LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 11–14 (2001). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 32. See Phyllis Palmer, Outside the Law: Agricultural and Domestic Workers under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL. HIST. 416 (1995). 
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Maternalist ideologies provided a constitutional justification for the 
New Deal and also shaped the design of its social welfare programs. 
Intersecting constructions of race and gender motivated maternalist 
advocates. In the early twentieth century, concerns about immigration, the 
status of African-Americans and white women’s “race suicide” motivated 
activists in the National Congress of Mothers and Parent-Teacher 
Association.
33
 Their appeal to motherhood thus simultaneously contained 
the promise of universality and an implicit racial hierarchy.
34
 During the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, the middle-class white female reformers 
who acted as architects of Aid to Dependent Children (“ADC”) exhibited 
class, ethnic, and racial biases. These biases led white maternalist 
reformers who defied the family-wage ideal in their own lives to enshrine 
that ideal in policy regulating immigrant, poor, and African-American 
women.
35
  
White maternalist activism starkly contrasted the maternalism of 
African-American women who during this time pursued health, childcare, 
and other welfare programs in their communities.
36
 Black maternalist 
activists were more accepting of single motherhood and looked more 
favorably upon maternal employment.
37
 Historian Linda Gordon argues 
that had black maternalists’ vision prevailed ADC would have offered 
more support to working mothers.
38
 Ultimately, however, racism plagued 
the administration of maternalist welfare programs. In 1931, black women 
comprised only three percent of mothers’ pension recipients.39 In the late 
1930s and 1940s, ADC bureaucrats largely excluded black women from 
assistance.
40
 
The history of feminist and labor reform in the early twentieth century 
sets the stage for this Article’s close analysis of legal strategies and 
political dynamics a half century later. Some of the insights of this early 
history concern strategic argumentation and ideological tensions within 
feminist legal advocacy. The history of maternalist advocacy in the 
 
 
 33. Activists in these two associations lobbied for school supplies, kindergartens, hot lunches, 
juvenile courts, and baby courts and, by the 1920s, played a pivotal role in advocating mothers’ 
pensions and administering the Sheppard-Towner Act. See MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER WORK: 
WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE STATE, 1890–1930, at 43–132 (1994). 
 34. Id. at 49–50.  
 35. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF 
WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 84–88 (1994).  
 36. Id. at 111–43. 
 37. Id. at 142. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 48. 
 40. Id. at 276.  
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progressive era highlights the strategic use of arguments about the 
protection of women to realize labor reform. In the 1970s, feminists and 
anti-abortion activists would similarly use neomaternal argumentation 
about the social value of motherhood to gain antidiscrimination 
protections for pregnant workers. In addition, the early history shows how 
a combination of strategic constraints and ideological differences divided 
feminist activism during the progressive era. In the 1970s, feminist 
advocacy for the PDA would synthesize commitments to equal treatment 
and the protection of working-class women’s economic security, thereby 
temporarily unifying elements of the women’s rights movement that had 
earlier divided. But in the 1980s legal and political constraints would 
again catalyze a tension between feminist advocates’ commitments to anti-
stereotyping and economic security for working-class women.  
Other insights gleaned from the early history of maternalist activism 
center on the political coalitions that feminists formed with other groups 
and the intersection of maternalist activism with the larger political 
culture. The history demonstrates how a strand of feminism that stressed 
equal treatment to the exclusion of concerns with protection aligned with 
the market libertarian interests of business. In the late twentieth century, 
feminists and the business lobby would draw on competing strains of 
liberal individualism, the former to challenge sex-role stereotypes under 
the law and the latter to legitimate the denial of pregnancy-related benefits. 
The history also reveals the intersection of racial and gender ideologies in 
the maternalist activism of the early twentieth century. In the 1970s, the 
political appeal of neomaternal arguments for the PDA rested in part on 
social anxieties about black and white motherhood. 
B. The Exclusion of Pregnancy from Public and Private Insurance Plans 
In the period between the New Deal and the 1970s, a loose patchwork 
of public welfare schemes and private employer benefits emerged. 
Employers responded in varying degrees to labor market, union, and 
political pressures to provide voluntary health, sick leave, and disability 
benefits. As a result, employees experienced disparate levels of protection 
against temporary dependence due to illness, injury, or disability. Many 
workers had no protections at all against losing their jobs and income 
when they experienced temporary periods of physical incapacity. These 
public and private insurance schemes provided the uneven baseline by 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
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which Title VII and the PDA’s equal-treatment mandates would be 
measured.
41
 
Of critical importance, the fight against pregnancy discrimination took 
place within a system that privatized healthcare as well as disability 
insurance. Although some state assistance schemes existed for the poor, 
only private disability, unemployment, and health insurance existed for the 
working and middle classes. Including pregnancy within these insurance 
systems would spread the costs of pregnancy among private families, 
workers, and employers.
42
 The United States, however, lacked taxpayer-
funded social insurance systems providing coverage for healthcare and 
disability, such as those that existed in Western European social 
democracies. In the absence of such social-insurance schemes, equal 
treatment for pregnancy under employee- and employer-paid insurance 
plans would not socialize the costs of reproduction.  
Before the rise of pregnancy discrimination law, neither employers nor 
states treated pregnant women as workers. Employers routinely fired 
employees from their jobs on the basis of their pregnant condition alone, 
despite their continued capacity to perform their job duties.
43
 As of 1971, 
thirty-eight states disqualified pregnancy from unemployment insurance. 
Unemployment compensation in the United States was restricted to those 
who became unemployed through no fault of their own and who were 
actively looking for work. States excluded pregnant women on the ground 
that by voluntarily becoming pregnant, they chose to render themselves 
incapable of working.
44
  
During the first half of the twentieth century, states also began to 
require employers to take responsibility for workplace injuries.
45
 In 1910, 
 
 
 41. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 989–98 (2013) 
(underscoring the importance of the development of these public and private insurance schemes to 
later pregnancy discrimination claims).  
 42. Private health insurance and disability benefits spread the costs of illness and disability 
between employers and employees. Employer and employee contributions funded the public disability 
insurance systems such as existed in five states. See infra note 48. Accordingly, although state 
disability insurance spread the costs of disability more fully than private insurance by requiring a 
broader employer base, they did not entirely socialize these costs.  
 43. See Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 352–
53 (2010). 
 44. Elizabeth Duncan Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 
N.Y.L.F. 480 (1971); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction 
of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 453 (2011). 
 45. In exchange for employers taking partial responsibility for accidents at work, employees 
waive tort liability. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 541 (7th ed. 2011). 
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New York enacted the first workmen’s compensation statute to pass 
constitutional muster, and by 1949 all states had some form of 
protection.
46
 As legal scholar Deborah Widiss observes, workers’ 
compensation statutes have played a critical role in structuring the 
different accommodations extended to pregnant employees and to other 
employees with workplace injuries.
47
  
In addition to excluding pregnant women from unemployment and 
workers’ compensation, states refused to classify pregnant women as 
temporarily disabled. At mid-century, five states—Rhode Island, 
California, New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii—and Puerto Rico 
implemented temporary disability insurance programs providing income 
replacement to workers with non-occupational injuries or illnesses.
48
 
These six jurisdictions provided unequal treatment of pregnancy and 
childbirth under their temporary disability insurance plans.
49
  
Private employers rarely provided coverage of pregnant workers under 
employer-sponsored fringe benefit programs.
50
 Employer-sponsored health 
insurance and other fringe benefits took a firm hold during World War II 
and expanded in the post-war period. The conventional explanation 
stresses a combination of legal and economic causal factors. In 1943, the 
National War Labor Board held that fringe benefits worth up to five 
percent of wages did not violate the wartime wage freeze.
51
 Employers 
confronting a scarce labor supply during the war turned to employee 
benefits as a means to attract workers. In the late 1940s, the National 
 
 
 46. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 103–04 (2000).  
 47. Workers’ compensation statutes provide financial incentives for employers to provide “light-
duty” assignments for injured employees. Widiss, supra note 41, at 985. Employers routinely deny 
comparable light-duty assignments for pregnant workers, and courts uphold these distinctions. Id. at 
1032–33 (arguing that the language of the PDA requires that employers provide the same light-duty 
accommodations to pregnant workers as they do to workers injured on the job). 
 48. In 1942, Rhode Island became the first state to enact legislation establishing a state-run 
insurance program. SHEILA B. KAMERMAN ET AL., MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 78 
(1983). California followed in 1946; New Jersey in 1948; New York in 1950; and Puerto Rico and 
Hawaii in 1969. Id. at 83–94.  
 49. California, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico all excluded pregnancy and childbirth from 
coverage under their temporary disability insurance schemes. Koontz, supra note 44, at 495. Rhode 
Island changed its policy in 1969 to treat pregnancy and childbirth differently than temporary 
disabilities caused by other conditions, implementing a flat benefit payment, which restricted coverage 
for “normal” pregnancy and delivery to a single lump-sum payment of $250. KAMERMAN, supra note 
48, at 78. New Jersey likewise covered pregnancy on a different basis than other conditions, restricting 
insurance payments to four weeks preceding the expected birth date and four weeks following the end 
of the pregnancy. KAMERMAN, supra note 48, at 86–87; Koontz, supra note 44, at 486. 
 50. Dinner, supra note 44, at 452–53. 
 51. JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 179 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
  
 
 
 
 
2014] STRANGE BEDFELLOWS AT WORK  469 
 
 
 
 
Labor Relations Board and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
ruled that the “conditions of employment,” about which managers had an 
obligation to negotiate with unions under the National Labor Relations 
Act, included insurance benefits and pensions.
52
 After Congress failed to 
pass national health insurance, unions increasingly used collective 
bargaining to achieve insurance for workers and their families. Between 
1948 and 1950, the number of workers covered by employer-provided 
health plans grew from 2.7 to more than 17 million; by 1954, health plans 
achieved via collective bargaining covered 12 million workers and 17 
million dependents.
53
  
Historian Jennifer Klein argues that the conventional explanation for 
the development of fringe benefit plans ignores a political struggle that 
took place among employers, workers, and the state. Klein argues that 
“[s]ince the late nineteenth century, American employers have relied on a 
program of welfare capitalism to deflect incursions into the workplace 
from the regulatory state or organized workers.”54 In the wake of the New 
Deal, employers expanded voluntary fringe benefits to foreclose workers’ 
efforts to enlist the state in regulating labor and expanding health and 
other forms of social insurance. Thus, fringe benefit plans represented 
employers’ efforts to define “the ideological meaning of security.”55 It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to reconcile these competing explanations. 
The historical literature suggests that a combination of political and 
economic motivations prompted employers to expand fringe benefit plans. 
In the post-World War II period, unions, particularly industrial unions 
with large numbers of active female members, made limited progress 
negotiating health insurance coverage for pregnancy and other maternity 
benefits.
56
 The majority of working women, however, suffered economic 
insecurity as a result of pregnancy.
57
 Many employers in nonunionized 
workplaces often denied coverage for physical disability related to 
 
 
 52. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948) (upholding the NLRB decision 
that pensions were a condition of employment under the meaning of the National Labor Relations 
Act), cert denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). See also PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST 
INDUSTRY 313 (1982); see also LAWRENCE S. ROOT, FRINGE BENEFITS: SOCIAL INSURANCE IN THE 
STEEL INDUSTRY 29–55 (1982). 
 53. STARR, supra note 52, at 313. 
 54. KLEIN, supra note 51, at 2.  
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 128–29 (2004). 
 57. Id. at 129. 
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pregnancy and childbirth under temporary disability benefits.
58
 Economist 
Barbara Bergmann theorized that the differential treatment of pregnancy 
formed one of several barriers that employers used to block women 
workers’ access to higher-paying jobs.59  
Pregnant workers also faced discrimination under health insurance 
plans. Almost forty percent of private health-insurance policies excluded 
pregnancy and childbirth-related medical and surgical expenses from 
coverage for employees, employees’ spouses, or both groups.60 Often, 
health insurance plans restricted benefits to married couples enrolled in 
family plans. Group plans offered maternity benefits to wives of male 
employees but not female workers, or only to those female workers whose 
husbands were enrolled in the same plan.
61
 The policies subsidized 
childbirths that took place within male-breadwinner/female-caregiver 
families, but not those births that took place in single-mother households 
or two-parent families in which women acted as primary wage-earners.  
We face the question why employers did not use pregnancy-related 
benefits to attract employees in a competitive labor market. The answer 
must lie in the fact that employers as well as policy designers possessed 
what historian Alice Kessler-Harris has termed a “gendered 
imagination.”62 Employers incorporated biases about gender roles and 
family provisioning into voluntary fringe benefit plans in a manner that 
deepened racial and gender inequalities.
63
 Employers understood the 
female employees who joined the workforce during World War II as only 
a temporary source of labor and forced them out of their jobs at the war’s 
end.
64
 The social construction of female employees as marginal workers 
limited the ideological impetus to extend pregnancy-related benefits.   
 
 
 58. Koontz, supra note 44, at 491–92.  
 59. Memorandum from Barbara Bergmann 17–19 (June 22, 1973) (on file with the Rutgers Univ. 
Alexander Library, Special Collections and Univ. Archives, International Union of Electrical, Radio, 
and Machine Workers, President’s Office Records: Paul Jennings [hereinafter IUE Records], Box 242, 
Folder: Bergmann, Barbara). 
 60. Koontz, supra note 44, at 491 (citing HEALTH INS. INST., NEW GROUP HEALTH INS. 10 
(1971)). 
 61. Statement of Herbert S. Denenberg, Pa. Ins. Comm’r, prepared for the Hearings on Econ. 
Problems of Women of the Joint Econ. Comm. of the U.S. Cong. on Women’s Access to Credit and 
Ins. 9 (July 12, 1973) (on file with Library of Cong., Patsy T. Mink Papers, Box 64, Folder 3).  
 62. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12 at 5–6. 
 63. KLEIN, supra note 51, at 10. 
 64. See RUTH MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX 
DURING WORLD WAR II 99–126 (1987). 
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C. Sex Equality Claims for the Inclusion of Pregnancy Within Public and 
Private Insurance Plans 
By the early 1970s, economic trends rendered the exclusion of 
pregnancy from public and private insurance plans increasingly harmful to 
greater numbers of women. These trends included: families’ greater need 
for women’s incomes, increases in women’s workforce participation, and 
greater labor-force attachment during pregnancy and following childbirth. 
Economic change poised women workers, unions, and the feminist 
movement to challenge ongoing pregnancy discrimination.  
Rising inflation
65
 and increasing rates of single motherhood
66
 
heightened the importance of women’s salaries as a source of familial 
income.
67
 In the mid-1970s, married women aged twenty-five to 
thirty-four experienced “soaring rates” of labor-market participation.68 
Women of color experienced this trend particularly acutely.
69
 By the late 
1960s, women of color’s labor-force participation rate reached 47.2%, 
while white women’s labor-market participation rate reached 39.8%.70 In 
1970, fifty-nine percent of single mothers’ engaged in paid employment.71  
Women in their childbearing years rode the crest of the wave of change 
in labor-market patterns. Women between the ages of twenty and thirty-
four accounted for the greatest increase in labor-force participation among 
women during the period from 1960 to 1974.
72
 By 1973, the proportion of 
 
 
 65. SCHULMAN, supra note 7, at 132–36. In 1964 and 1965 the annual rate of change in the U.S. 
consumer price index was 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively. In 1973, 1974, and 1975, the annual rates of 
change were 6.2%, 11.0%, and 9.1%, respectively. MICHAEL FRENCH, U.S. ECONOMIC HISTORY 
SINCE 1945 46 (1997). 
 66. By 1970, ten percent of all families with children had female heads of household. 
KAMERMAN, supra note 48, at 7. 
 67. In 1970, wives contributed twenty percent of family income nationwide; women working 
full-time contributed thirty-nine percent of their families’ incomes in 1983. Id. at 10. 
 68. During this period, married women’s labor supply was quite elastic and the income effect 
small enough that demand drove increases in both labor-force participation rates and hours worked. 
Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and 
Family, 96 AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 1, 6. 
 69. Between 1967 and 1969, the median husband’s income in nonwhite families was $41,800 
lower than in white families. Deborah A. Dawson, Trends and Differentials in Employment During 
Pregnancy, United States, 1963 and 1967–69, at 67, 68 (on file with the IUE Records, Box 241, 
Folder: Gilbert v. General Electric Co., Trends and differentials in employment during pregnancy 
1963). 
 70. This represented a thirty-nine percent increase in the labor-force participation rate of 
nonwhite women, between the years 1963 and the period from 1967–1969, and a twenty-eight percent 
increase for white women. Id. 
 71. KAMERMAN, supra note 48, at 7.  
 72. Id. 
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women who worked during pregnancy reached forty-two percent.
73
 In 
addition to continuing to work during pregnancy, women evinced 
heightened labor-force attachment following childbirth. Of those women 
in the United States who gave birth between 1971 and 1972, thirty-one 
percent returned to work within one year following childbirth.
74
  
Workers, union leaders, and feminist activists identified pregnancy 
discrimination as one of the most harmful forms of sex inequality. 
Beginning in 1970, feminist legal advocates joined the longstanding effort 
of labor feminists to gain equal treatment for pregnancy within insurance 
schemes. That year, the Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of 
Women issued a statement of principles arguing that pregnancy should be 
treated as a temporary disability under employment benefit schemes.
75
 The 
temporary disability paradigm represented an effort to realize the related 
goals of achieving socio-economic protections for women workers and 
combatting gender stereotypes. The paradigm challenged gender 
stereotypes in three ways. First, the temporary disability framework 
rejected the notion that pregnancy categorically disqualified women from 
working. Instead, the paradigm required employers to conduct 
individualized assessments of whether pregnant employees could continue 
to perform their job duties. Second, the temporary disability paradigm 
distinguished between women’s biological and social roles in 
reproduction. The paradigm suggested that women should get the same 
sick leave and disability benefits offered other temporarily disabled 
workers. It also, however, decoupled pregnancy leave from parental leave 
that might be taken by either women or men. Third, classifying pregnancy 
within a broader legal category rejected the notion that female employees’ 
childbearing capacity imposed unique costs on employers.
76
 
Labor activists as well as feminist attorneys were at the forefront of the 
fight against pregnancy discrimination.
77
 Since 1955, the International 
Union of Electrical Workers (“IUE”) had attempted to bargain with 
General Electric to gain maternity benefits for female workers, but had not 
 
 
 73. Id. at 135. 
 74. Id.  
 75. CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, JOB RELATED MATERNITY 
BENEFITS 1 (1970).  
 76. Dinner, supra note 44, at 450–52. 
 77. These groups also overlapped. Labor feminists were activists who, from the New Deal to the 
early 1970s, fought for women’s rights within the labor movement while also using unions as a vehicle 
to achieve broader sex equality. COBBLE, supra note 56, at 4. 
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met with any success.
78
 Antidiscrimination law provided a potentially 
powerful new tool in labor negotiations. In the spring of 1971, a newsletter 
of the IUE legal department reported that the EEOC had issued its first 
ruling that the exclusion of pregnancy from disability coverage violated 
Title VII. The newsletter also provided exemplary language that workers 
could use to file grievances.
79
 A chief steward at a General Electric plant 
in Salem, Virginia, was sympathetic to women’s rights and urged 
members of Local 161 to challenge General Electric’s exclusion of 
pregnancy from its sickness and accident benefit coverage. More than 
three hundred female workers asked for EEOC charge forms to file 
pregnancy discrimination claims.
80
  
The demand for pregnancy disability benefits affirmed a social norm 
(new for white if not for black women) that women might occupy 
simultaneous roles as workers and mothers.
81
 Women in the shops began 
to file charges of discrimination based on the denial of sick pay for 
pregnancy-related disabilities at a rate that would outstrip the filing of 
general sex-discrimination charges related to equal pay or promotions over 
the next couple of years.
82
 The workers claimed that childbearing women 
had the right to keep their jobs and to gain the benefits attached to the 
employment relationship. Union activists and feminists’ sex equality 
claims triggered a debate about whether law should attribute responsibility 
for the costs of reproduction to the private family or to employers. Female 
 
 
 78. Direct examination of Thomas F. Hilbert, Jr., Labor Counsel for Gen. Elec. Co., Gilbert v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974) (on file with the IUE Records, Box 243). 
 79. Pre-Trial Stipulation of Facts at 3, Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 142-72-R (E.D. Va. July 14, 
1973) (on file with the IUE Records, Box 241, Folder: pleadings 11-72 to 12-73). 
 80. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. 
on Labor of the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 301 (1977) [hereinafter S. 995 Hearings]. 
 81. African-American women historically experienced labor exploitation at the same time as 
social and political devaluation of their caregiving as mothers. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE 
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1999) (arguing that control of 
black women’s reproduction has functioned as a critical tool of racial oppression from slavery through 
the late twentieth century). Accordingly, black women’s activism focused not only on equal 
employment opportunity but also on the economic resources and legal rights necessary to care for their 
children. See TERA W. HUNTER, TO ’JOY MY FREEDOM: SOUTHERN BLACK WOMEN’S LIVES AND 
LABORS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (1997) (describing how black domestic laborers in Reconstruction 
Atlanta resisted exploitation by their employers by taking time and resources to care for their family 
and to engage in communal childrearing practices); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF 
SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985) 
(describing how black women’s decisions regarding work placed their family’s survival as an 
overarching priority); ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PALACE: HOW BLACK MOTHERS 
FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY 131–208 (2005) (chronicling the politicization of black 
mothers in Las Vegas from the late 1950s through the early 1990s). 
 82. Brief of Int’l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, as Amicus Curiae 
at 14, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640) [hereinafter IUE Brief, Geduldig]. 
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workers made the claim that they deserved equal recognition as workers, 
with equal rights to the forms of insurance and security provided to men.
83
  
When workers’ grievances did not prompt General Electric to revise its 
policies, the IUE turned to the courts. In the spring of 1972, the IUE filed 
a complaint in federal district court on behalf of seven female employees, 
the union, and Local 161. The plaintiffs in Gilbert v. General Electric Co. 
claimed that General Electric Company discriminated on the basis of sex 
in violation of Title VII when it excluded pregnancy from temporary 
disability benefits.
84
 In defending against the Gilbert litigation, General 
Electric and other employers argued that the costs of including coverage 
for pregnancy within existing benefit schemes would prove overwhelming. 
An actuary testifying for General Electric in federal district court 
estimated that based upon an average thirteen-week leave, it would cost 
the nation’s employers $804 million to provide short-term sickness and 
accident benefits for pregnancy. Including pregnancy in long term 
disability plans would cost another $1.35 billion.
85
 The American 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. estimated that the addition of eight weeks of 
paid maternity leave cost the company $15.8 million from 1970 to 1971 
and $19 million in 1972.
86
  
A changed economic landscape contributed to employers’ reluctance to 
grant coverage related to pregnancy and childbirth. Employers faced 
rising costs in providing benefits. Between 1950 and 1976 the 
Consumer Price Index rose 112% but medical costs skyrocketed by 
191%.
87 
Employer spending on private health insurance increased from 
$700 million in 1950 to $12.1 billion in 1970.
88 
An economic 
recession in the early 1970s deepened employers’ resistance to sex 
equality claims that would force them to assume greater responsibility for 
the costs of pregnancy and childbirth.  
 
 
 83. See Dinner, supra note 44, at 426–27. 
 84. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058, 1058–59 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
 85. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (No. 74-
1245). 
 86. Linda H. Kistler & Carol C. McDonough, Paid Maternity Leave—Benefits May Justify the 
Cost, 26 LAB. L.J. 782, 784 (1975). 
 87. S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 473. 
 88. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: TABLE 34.1 
(2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter%2034.pdf. 
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D. Traditional Gender Ideologies as a Defense to Pregnancy 
Discrimination Claims 
Cost calculations had not always served as General Electric’s rationale 
for offering different benefits to male and female employees. Instead, in 
the early twentieth century General Electric explicitly appealed to 
traditional gender roles to justify the exclusion of women from benefit 
schemes. In 1920, the president of General Electric, Gerard Swope, stated 
that female employees did not deserve any disability benefits because 
women “did not recognize the responsibilities of life.”89 Swope reasoned 
that women “were hoping to get married soon and leave the company.”90 
Offering women workers insurance to help them make it through a period 
of disability made no sense if women did not genuinely need a salary and 
worked only to gain supplemental income for incidentals; if women did 
not support dependents; if women did not show loyalty to the company; if 
they were not truly workers at all.  
A half century after Swope made his comments, his views remained 
current. Employers, insurance executives, and business trade associations 
mobilized family-wage and separate-sphere ideologies to justify the 
exclusion from coverage within disability, sick leave, and health 
insurance. They argued that women were only marginal labor-market 
participants who would leave the workforce when they entered their 
childbearing years. The discriminatory treatment of pregnancy and 
childbirth under public and private insurance schemes rested not only on 
cost rationales but also on ideologies about both the family and wage 
work. Pregnancy discrimination embodied a number of gendered 
assumptions. These included: the notion that childbearing women 
belonged in the home; the assumption that women would leave the 
workforce when they became mothers; the idea that women were marginal 
labor force participants who did not need or deserve the benefits merited 
workers; and the notion that male household heads should remain 
responsible for the costs of reproduction and would provide for dependent 
women and children. 
The business lobby thus relied on sex-role stereotypes to rationalize 
discriminatory treatment of pregnancy. First, the business lobby argued 
that pregnancy disability benefits raised the specter of a moral hazard 
because women would malinger beyond the period of physical recovery 
 
 
 89. FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 109 (2009). 
 90. Id.  
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from childbirth to care for their infants.
91
 An actuary who testified for 
General Electric Co. in federal district court projected women would take 
an average of fifteen weeks of pregnancy disability leave, rather than the 
six to eight weeks cited by physicians as the average period of recovery 
from childbirth.
92
 Businesses offered varying and sometimes contradictory 
reasons for their belief that women would malinger. At times, employers 
and insurance underwriters operated on the assumption that women could 
rely on the income of their husbands.
93
 Women did not really want or need 
to work, so they had no incentive to return as quickly as possible after 
childbirth.
94
 Employers also assumed, however, that the fact that women 
would recover some portion of their salary during pregnancy disability 
leave would encourage them to abuse the benefit.
95
 
Second, the business lobby contended that women would take their 
benefits and run. Because pregnant workers “more often than not, [did] not 
return to work after delivery,”96 pregnancy disability benefits would 
function as “a unique form of severance pay.”97 Private employers and 
insurance companies justified the exclusion of pregnancy from 
employment benefits on the expectation that the vast majority of women 
would not continue to work after bearing children.  
Employers argued that women’s allegiance to their children rather than 
the workforce would frustrate a primary purpose of private benefit plans—
improving employee loyalty. Townsend Munson, the Chairman of 
Western Savings Bank in Philadelphia, explained that an employee 
receiving temporary disability benefits ordinarily felt “grateful to our Bank 
for a generous disability policy and comes back to us after recovery 
 
 
 91. Kistler & McDonough, supra note 86, at 785. 
 92. IUE Brief, Geduldig, supra note 82, at 88. The actuary based his estimation in part on the 
assumption that physicians would collude with women in certifying them to stay at home for a longer 
period of time. Id. at 91. 
 93. Statement of Herbert S. Denenberg, supra note 61, at 11. 
 94. Id. at 6.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Am. Life Ins. Assoc., Nat’l Assoc. of Ind. Insurers, Am. 
Mut. Ins. Alliance & Health Ins. Assoc. of Am. at 5, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 
(1976) (No. 74-1245); see also Motion of & Brief of Alaska Airlines, Inc. et al. for Leave to File Brief 
as Amici Curiae at 9, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (No. 74-1245) [hereinafter 
Motion and Brief of Alaska Airlines] (arguing that forty to fifty percent of women workers did not 
return to their jobs following childbirth). 
 97. Brief for Gen. Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 13, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 
U.S. 737 (1976) (No. 74-1245); Brief of the Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. as Amicus Curiae at 8, Liberty Mut. 
Ins. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (No. 74-1245). 
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thankful for what we have done.”98 By contrast, a female recipient of the 
company’s maternity leave “comes back only to collect her benefits and 
then leaves for good.” 99 Munson reflected upon the normative propriety of 
these patterns in women’s workforce participation. He concluded that 
“disability provisions for pregnancy are obviously not to tide a woman 
over until her return to employment. In a sense, when she leaves she is 
already committed to a new employer—the child. Quite rightly.”100  
As a statistical matter, Munson, General Electric, and the business 
lobby were not wrong. At the time that the IUE filed the Gilbert case in 
federal district court, over two-thirds of female employees nationwide who 
worked during their pregnancies did not return to the workforce within one 
year after childbirth.
101
 No data is available, however, on how many of 
these women left the workforce wholly voluntarily. Many may have found 
themselves pushed out of the labor market when their employers did not 
offer job-guaranteed leave either for temporary disability associated with 
childbirth or for early infant care. Thus, the discrimination that women 
faced created the social reality that employers used to justify the exclusion 
of pregnancy from employment benefits. Social scientific studies 
conducted after this period substantiated the argument that incidences of 
sex discrimination
102
 and the existence or absence of childbearing leave
103
 
affect women’s labor market participation. 
Traditional gender ideologies, however, diminished in legal and 
political potency during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. First, the 
advent of sex discrimination law undermined the legitimacy of legal 
arguments explicitly based on sex-role stereotypes. In 1971, in the case of 
Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court for the first time struck down a state law 
as a violation of sex equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
104
 In 1972, 
Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment and sent it to the states for 
 
 
 98. Letter from Townsend Munson to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Jan. 26, 1977) (on file with the 
Library of Cong., Ruth Bader Ginsburg Papers [hereinafter RBG Papers]); see also Ms. Munson Has 
Wedding on L.I., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988.  
 99. Letter from Townsend Munson, supra note 98. 
 100. Id. 
 101. KAMERMAN, supra note 48, at 135. 
 102. See David Neumark & Michele McLennan, Sex Discrimination and Women’s Labor Market 
Outcomes, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 713, 713–14 (1995) (arguing that a “feedback” loop exists between 
sex discrimination and labor market participation and thus offering an alternative to the human capital 
explanation of wage differential between women and men). 
 103. See, e.g., Jutta M. Joesch, Paid Leave and the Timing of Women’s Employment Before and 
After Birth, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1008, 1017 (1997) (finding that women with paid childbearing 
leave are more likely to return to work during the second month following delivery and subsequent 
months than those without such leave). 
 104. 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
478 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:453 
 
 
 
 
ratification.
105
 In 1973, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero v. 
Richardson argued that courts should apply a strict-scrutiny standard of 
review to state regulation on the basis of sex.
106
 Employers, insurance 
companies, and states faced a transformed legal and political landscape. 
Arguments that appealed to traditional gender ideologies to justify the 
exclusion of pregnancy from insurance coverage no longer held the 
persuasive power they once possessed.  
Second, the feminist movement put pressure on businesses and states to 
conform to a legal regime that would transform gender norms rather than 
reinforce them. Feminist legal thinkers began to advance the theory that 
legal structures did not simply reflect society; instead, legal rules 
constituted social norms and behaviors.
107
 Feminists argued that 
businesses and states should adopt legal practices that would disrupt the 
sex-based division of productive and reproductive labor.
108
 In responding 
to Townsend Munson’s claim that childbearing women left the workforce, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg made the point that “an employer’s attitude may 
bear substantially on the employee’s decision” whether to return to the 
workplace.
109
  
Evidence existed at the time attesting to the veracity of Ginsburg’s 
statement. For example, one New England firm found that the percentage 
of female employees returning to the workforce increased after the firm 
started offering paid childbearing leave. Academic observers commented 
that the firm’s experience “cast doubt on the appropriateness of citing 
termination statistics among female employees in firms which do not 
provide maternity leave to support the argument that such leave would be 
abused.”110  
Third, feminists began to argue that sex-role stereotypes inflected the 
business lobby’s statistics about the costs of pregnancy disability benefits. 
Businesses estimated the cost of pregnancy disability leave based on 
figures drawn from mandatory maternity leave plans, which required 
 
 
 105. MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE 
AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 64 (1986).  
 106. 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). 
 107. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, at 8–15 
(1975). 
 108. See, e.g., Koontz, supra note 44, at 481. 
 109. Letter from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Townsend Munson (Jan. 31, 1977) (on file with the 
RBG Papers). 
 110. Kistler & McDonough, supra note 86, at 786. 
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female employees to stop working mid-way through their pregnancies.
111
 
Moreover, labor and feminist groups argued that employers used out-of-
date birth rates and failed to take into account the fact that employed 
women had lower birth rates.
112
 Finally, employers based statistics 
regarding cost-to-contribution ratios on average wage rates for the 
workforce, while in actuality women’s wages averaged only sixty percent 
of those of men.
113
 
Academic commentators argued that the total cost of pregnancy 
disability benefits appeared far less onerous when converted to unit costs 
per employee. They took General Electric’s actuarial estimate of an $804 
million nationwide cost as an example. If the average period of paid leave 
were reduced to eight weeks—what medical experts at the time considered 
medically appropriate—then the cost of pregnancy disability leave would 
amount to only $5.60 for each worker in the U.S. labor force in 1974, or 
$15 for each employed female worker.
114
 A study of three New England 
industrial firms that offered paid childbearing leave suggested that total 
disability premiums did not rise as a consequence above five percent of 
annual payroll.
115
 By the early 1970s, the business lobby thus confronted 
the limits of extant justifications for excluding pregnancy from insurance 
coverage.  
Debates about reproductive choice, pregnancy, and the workplace in 
the 1970s were overlaid upon a longer history of feminist activism, 
welfare capitalism, and state development. In the progressive era and New 
Deal periods, maternalism helped to lay the foundation for the U.S. 
welfare state. Gender ideologies functioned as a justification for state and 
federal authority to regulate the labor market. Maternalist arguments 
wielded by feminists and progressive reformers made previously private 
virtues of caregiving and social protection into public values. Maternalism 
thus legitimated concerns about the exploitation of workers within 
constitutional jurisprudence. At the same time, the use of gender 
ideologies to justify social provisioning enabled the development of public 
and private insurance schemes premised on a masculine ideal. The 
exclusion of pregnancy and childbirth from employment-based insurance 
 
 
 111. Brief for the Am. Fed. of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amicus Curiae at 5, Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640) [hereinafter Brief for the Am. Fed. of Labor & Cong. of 
Indus. Orgs.]; IUE Brief, Geduldig, supra note 82, at 87. 
 112. Brief for Appellees at 85–86, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640) 
[hereinafter Appellees’ Brief, Geduldig]; IUE Brief, Geduldig, supra note 82, at 87.   
 113. Brief for the Am. Fed. of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., supra note 111, at 28–29.   
 114. Kistler & McDonough, supra note 86, at 784. 
 115. Id. at 791. 
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schemes undermined women’s security and heightened their economic 
dependence.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the advent of sex discrimination law 
under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause invested labor and 
feminist activists with a new tool to combat the exclusion of pregnancy 
from state and employer-sponsored insurance. Activists wielded liberal 
individualist ideals of equal treatment and sex neutrality to challenge 
gender stereotypes and to realize a longstanding commitment to improving 
the economic security of women workers. State officials, employers, and 
business groups continued to defend pregnancy discrimination on the basis 
of separate-spheres and family-wage ideologies. Several trends, however, 
undermined these justifications: the advent of sex discrimination law; the 
rise of a mass feminist movement focused on transforming gender roles; 
and the increasing recognition that gender bias inflected employers’ 
statistics about childbearing women in the workplace. Employers would 
need a new argument to defend the allocation of the costs of reproduction 
to the private family. To preserve one pillar of liberalism—the 
privatization of dependency—they turned to a new strain of liberalism 
rising in legal and political legitimacy: reproductive choice. 
II. LIBERAL INDIVIDUALIST CHOICE DISCOURSE ON THE RISE IN THE 
COURTS 
Reproductive choice and privacy offered a powerful new discursive 
frame that the opponents of pregnancy disability benefits used to recast 
their stance. Yet reproductive choice was not a static concept. Part II.A 
discusses competing conceptions of reproductive choice in the 1970s. The 
business lobby fused notions of reproductive privacy with free-market 
ideologies. By contrast, feminists advanced an affirmative vision of choice 
that encompassed childbearing women’s right to economic autonomy.  
In pregnancy discrimination litigation, the business lobby and state 
governments attempted to refashion feminist principles as compatible with 
rather than oppositional to market conservatism. Part II.B discusses how 
employers, insurance companies, and state governments appropriated a 
liberal individualist strain of feminism steadily gaining legitimacy within 
the broader legal culture to serve market libertarian interests. Business 
trade associations and state officials argued that because the legalization of 
birth control and abortion had rendered pregnancy a private choice, the 
costs of reproduction should remain a private responsibility. Part II.C 
argues that this legal strategy heightened the salience of neomaternal 
argumentation for feminists. The Supreme Court, however, embraced a 
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market libertarian construction of sex equality, as Part II.D and II.E 
demonstrate.  
A. Competing Conceptions of Choice  
The business lobby’s strategic use of reproductive choice arguments 
drew upon market libertarian ideology ascendant in the 1970s. During this 
period, economists in the United States and Britain led by Milton 
Friedman and Frederick Hayek popularized the notion that free-market 
principles would realize the individual freedom promised by classical 
liberalism.
116
 Legal scholarship, likewise, embraced microeconomic 
theories of individual choice as a means to explain legal doctrine.
117
 
During this period, too, unions declined in power and the political tides 
turned against federal regulation of the labor market and workplace.
118
 
Employers began to cut back on the fringe benefits that they had earlier 
extended.
 
The business lobby’s use of reproductive choice rhetoric 
resonated with these intertwined trends in economic theory, politics, 
legal theory, and employer practices. 
State officials and business executives put a new twist on market 
libertarian principles in debates about pregnancy discrimination. They 
drew on the privacy logic of Roe v. Wade to justify private, familial 
responsibility for the costs of pregnancy.
119
 The notion of reproductive 
choice justified classifying pregnancy as a “voluntary” condition rather 
than a temporary disability.
120
 The business lobby further argued that 
because women now had the ability to choose whether to occupy roles as 
mothers or workers, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not 
amount to sex discrimination. This form of legal argument interpreted Roe 
in a manner consistent with growing political opposition to the growth of a 
regulatory state.
121
 The rise of privacy as a conceptual paradigm in the 
 
 
 116. See ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 308–09 (1999). 
 117. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 42–76 (2011); NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 301–420 (1995). 
 118. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 178–211 
(2002). 
 119. For a contemporary argument that the constitutionalization of access to abortion as a negative 
right has the consequence of legitimizing the dearth of state support for family life, see Robin West, 
From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 
(2009).  
 120. See CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, WOMEN IN 1971, at 53–54 
(1972); Erica B. Grubb & Margarita C. McCoy, Comment, Love’s Labors Lost: New Conceptions of 
Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 260, 288 (1972) (citing BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 
THE NEGRO & TITLE VII, SEX & TITLE VII 22 (Personnel Policies Forum, Survey No. 82 (1967))).  
 121. For a history of conservatives’ legal opposition to the regulatory state, see Jefferson Decker, 
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reproductive rights context was intertwined with the increasing popularity 
of market libertarianism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The market libertarian interpretation of reproductive choice differed 
dramatically from the construction of reproductive choice advanced by 
feminists. Although Roe itself privileged privacy, feminists argued for 
reproductive autonomy as well as reproductive privacy. That autonomy 
meant having the right to bear a child as well as to terminate a pregnancy. 
Feminists of color launched reproductive rights campaigns against forced 
sterilization.
122
 Activists argued not only for the right to abortion but also 
for state funding that would enable women to exercise a full range of 
reproductive choice.  
Feminist activists believed that neither childbearing nor childrearing 
should diminish women’s capacity for engagement in the public sphere. 
The 1970 Strike for Women’s Equality planned for the fiftieth anniversary 
of the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment made three demands: equal 
opportunity in education and employment; free, nonrestricted abortion; 
and free, twenty-four hour universal childcare. Feminist activists 
envisioned childcare as a social citizenship right that would enable 
women’s full civic participation.123 
After the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then-
counsel to the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, argued that just as women 
had gained recognition for a constitutional right to abortion so too did 
women have a right to bear children without sacrificing equal employment 
opportunity.
124
 Ginsburg argued that the termination of pregnant 
employees by states or the federal government violated Title VII and 
women’s constitutional right to reproductive privacy.125 In sum, feminists 
understood reproductive autonomy to encompass private choice as well as 
public entitlements both to antidiscrimination protections and to 
affirmative social resources.  
 
 
Lawyers for Reagan: The Conservative Litigation Movement and American Government, 1971–1987 
(2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ.). 
 122. See JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 55–
84 (2003). 
 123. On second-wave feminist thought and activism regarding childcare, see Deborah Dinner, The 
Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy, and the Dynamics of Feminist 
Activism, 1966–1974, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 577 (2010).  
 124. Dinner, supra note 43, at 385–87. 
 125. Id. at 383–84. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/3
  
 
 
 
 
2014] STRANGE BEDFELLOWS AT WORK  483 
 
 
 
 
B. States and the Business Lobby Embrace Privacy and Choice  
In May of 1972, Sally Armendariz was driving near her home in 
Gilroy, California, when another vehicle rear-ended her car. As a result of 
the accident, Armendariz suffered a miscarriage at four months of 
pregnancy. Severe pain ensued, and Armendariz’s doctor ordered her to 
stay home from work for three weeks. Her misfortune could not have 
come at a worse time. Armendariz’s husband had just become 
unemployed, and her income served as the sole support for the couple and 
their eight-month-old son.
126
  
Armendariz first thought to apply to the California State Disability 
Insurance program. She had paid one percent of her monthly salary for the 
past ten years into the insurance program, and she had never filed for 
benefits.
127
 The California Department of Human Resources, however, 
denied Armendariz’s claim because her disability “[arose] in connection 
with pregnancy.”128 Armendariz then applied for state unemployment 
insurance benefits but was again denied benefits, this time because the 
state considered her pregnancy-related disability “voluntary.”129 That 
administrative determination must have held a cruel irony for Amendariz. 
She would have considered her car accident and miscarriage far from 
voluntary. 
Armendariz was a tenacious member of a Mexican-American family 
that had worked for generations in California’s farm fields.130 She was the 
second child and first daughter in her extended family to graduate from 
high school.
131
 Armendariz decided to sue the state.
132
 Along with three 
other named petitioners, Armendariz brought a lawsuit, Aiello v. Hansen, 
which challenged the constitutionality of California’s disability insurance 
plan under the Equal Protection Clause. The lawsuit would ultimately 
reach the Supreme Court as Geduldig v. Aiello.
133
  
In June 1973, the plaintiffs in Aiello won in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California.
134
 The district court held that the 
 
 
 126. STREBEIGH, supra note 89, at 82. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 83. 
 129. Id. at 82–83 (emphasis omitted). 
 130. Id. at 81. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 83. 
 133. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Because the case involved the constitutionality of a state statute, it was 
heard by a three-judge panel of a United States District Court with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Id. at 486–87. 
 134. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
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state’s exclusion from coverage of “any injury or illness caused by or 
arising in connection with pregnancy” violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.
135
 Dwight M. Geduldig, the director of the California Department 
of Human Resources warned the New York Times that a recent court 
decision would “bust” the state’s disability insurance program.136 He 
anticipated that the program would go insolvent within the year if the 
California legislature did not increase the employer payroll tax that funded 
it.
137
 
The Supreme Court granted an appeal in Geduldig v. Aiello, in 
December 1973.
138
 Business interests as well as labor, feminist, and civil 
rights groups understood that the case would hold broad import. The AFL-
CIO submitted an amicus brief on the basis that the case would affect its 
300,000 female workers employed in the state of California.
139
 Even 
though the case concerned a challenge to a state insurance program, its 
outcome would directly affect private employers’ fringe benefit plans. The 
California Law allowed employers to offer private disability insurance 
plans as an alternative to the state-administered Unemployment 
Compensation Disability Fund. To gain approval of a “voluntary plan,” an 
employer had to show that it offered benefits that exceeded those offered 
under the state plan.
140
 Therefore, if the Court held that equal protection 
required the state plan to include coverage for pregnancy, then employers 
would also have to provide such coverage.
141
 California business trade 
associations and employers—the Merchants and Manufacturers 
 
 
 135. Id. at 797–801. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California did not apply 
heightened scrutiny. But the majority agreed with constitutional scholar, Gerald Gunther, that the 
Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed had rendered the rational-basis test under the Equal Protection 
Clause “slightly, but perceptibly, more rigorous.” Id. at 796 (quoting Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 
473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973)). The majority held that pregnancy-related disability did not 
substantially differ from the temporary disabilities covered by the insurance program, in any manner 
relevant to the program’s purpose. Id. at 797–801. 
 136. Geduldig projected that including pregnancy within the state’s insurance program would cost 
an additional $120 million per year above the program’s annual $375 million in expenditures. 
Disability Payment on Pregnancy Held Peril to Coast Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1973, at L27. 
 137. Id. The funding for California’s disability insurance program came entirely from deductions 
from employee wages. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 487. 
 138. 414 U.S. 1110 (1973) (noting probable jurisdiction).  
 139. Brief for the Am. Fed. of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs., supra note 111, at 1–2.  
 140. Brief of Merchs. & Mfrs. Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae at 2–4, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 
484 (1974) (No. 73-640). 
 141. Public disability insurance plans have an even more direct effect on private plans. Because 
employers make contributions to the funding of public temporary disability insurance plans, such plans 
influence whether employers adopt voluntary private plans. The business lobby may have preferred to 
keep the costs of California’s temporary disability insurance plan relatively low, to give employers 
greater financial incentives to adopt private health insurance plans. This outcome would both preserve 
employer control and benefit the private insurance industry. 
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Association and the Federated Employers of the Bay Area, Southern 
California Edison Company, Union Oil Company of California, and 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company—submitted an amicus curiae 
brief defending the pregnancy exclusion.
142
 The business associations 
expressed concern about the “substantial financial effect” of a potential 
Supreme Court ruling upholding the district court decision and “wish[ed] 
to assure that their unique financial interest [was] adequately protected.”143  
Observers also recognized the indirect influence that a ruling under the 
Equal Protection Clause would have on statutory antidiscrimination 
standards. The IUE and EEOC submitted amicus briefs on the basis that 
Aiello would have significance for sex discrimination standards under 
Title VII
144
 and, in particular, for the resolution of the Gilbert case then 
pending in federal district court.
145
 Business interests similarly highlighted 
the fluidity of equal protection and statutory antidiscrimination standards. 
Writing as amicus curiae, the Chamber of Commerce called the 
constitutional question in Geduldig “significant.” The Chamber found 
“even more compelling,” however, the question of whether the Court’s 
constitutional decision would take account of recent EEOC guidelines 
requiring equal coverage of pregnancy under temporary disability benefit 
plans. The Chamber of Commerce advised the Court to look beyond 
Geduldig to the parallel question arising under Title VII.
146
  
In arguing Geduldig v. Aiello, the State of California and business 
groups relied on familiar arguments resting on sex-role stereotypes
147
 and 
also turned toward market libertarian choice discourse. To oppose the 
plaintiffs’ claim in Geduldig, California needed to argue that state 
classification on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute sex 
discrimination. To this end, the state’s brief appealed to liberal ideals of 
individual agency. The brief read: “[P]regnancy [is not] the sine qua non 
of being a woman. . . . [A] large part of woman’s struggle for equality 
involves gaining social acceptance for roles alternative to childbearing and 
 
 
 142. Brief of Merchs. & Mfrs. Ass’n, et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 140, at 2. 
 143. Id. at 9. 
 144. Brief of the U.S. EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 1–2, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
(No. 78-640) [hereinafter EEOC Brief, Geduldig].  
 145. IUE Brief, Geduldig, supra note 82, at 1–3. 
 146. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of the Appellant at 
3, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640). 
 147. California argued “that there is a major difference in the return-to-work rate following 
disability from pregnancy.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 
(1974) (No. 73-640) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
486 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:453 
 
 
 
 
childrearing.”148 The brief portrayed women as autonomous individuals 
who might assert their agency by choosing either motherhood or other 
social roles. It drew a distinction between biological sex and the social 
construction of gender, which resonated with liberal theories of sex 
equality. 
Even if classification on the basis of pregnancy did not amount to sex 
discrimination, California still needed to establish that the exclusion of 
pregnancy was rational. To this end, the state sought to prove pregnancy 
was not properly classified as a temporary disability. California argued: 
“Pregnancy is neither an illness nor an injury but is a normal biological 
function . . . voluntary and subject to planning.”149 The defendants and 
amici cited the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions legalizing birth 
control and abortion as evidence. The Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, 
they argued, had made pregnancy truly a choice.
150
 California thus took a 
central victory for the liberal individualist strain of feminism and turned it 
against sex-egalitarian claims for pregnancy disability benefits. 
California asserted that because women could foresee and plan for 
pregnancy, actuarial principles did not support classifying pregnancy as a 
temporary disability. Foreseeability alone, however, could not do all the 
logical work for those defending the state of California against the 
Geduldig litigation. Sickness and injury formed an ordinary part of the 
male and female life cycle. If one could plan for conceiving a child, then 
arguably one could also plan for the near inevitability of periodic, 
temporary disability. The fact that many women chose to become 
pregnant, and not the fact that pregnancy could be anticipated, formed the 
crucial distinction. In seeking to distinguish between pregnancy and 
temporary disability, California and trade associations writing as amici 
made a normative as well as a formal argument. They suggested that 
pregnancy’s character as a choice legitimated the attribution of the costs of 
reproduction to the private family.  
C. Feminists Turn toward Neomaternal Arguments  
The plaintiffs in Geduldig made liberal individualist arguments to 
challenge the pregnancy exclusion. They argued that just as California 
pooled the risk of disability for all workers, regardless of actuarial 
 
 
 148. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640) 
[hereinafter Reply Brief, Geduldig]. 
 149. Id. at 13. 
 150. Brief for Appellant at 19 n.23, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640). 
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considerations, so too should the state pool the risk of disability resulting 
from pregnancy.
151
 The pregnancy exclusion reinforced “stereotyped 
notions that women belong in the home with their children, that women 
are not serious members of the work force, and that women generally have 
a male breadwinner in their families to support them.”152 California and 
the business lobby’s turn toward a market libertarian interpretation of sex 
equality, however, heightened the salience of neomaternal arguments for 
the plaintiffs in Geduldig and sympathetic amici. In response to 
California’s arguments, the plaintiffs and supportive amici restitched a 
tight seam between female reproductive capacity, sex difference, and 
gender identity.  
To counter California’s disaggregation of pregnancy and sex, the 
plaintiffs needed to establish as a matter of formal legal interpretation that 
pregnancy-based and sex-based discrimination were synonymous. The 
brief for the plaintiffs argued that “[s]ex unique characteristics, 
particularly the capacity to become pregnant, are what define a person as a 
man or a woman.”153 This argument reduced gender to male and female 
reproductive capacity. The rhetoric was ironic. It proved strategically 
advantageous to the plaintiffs to link pregnancy with gender status, even 
as the broader feminist movement challenged the idea that female biology 
should determine gender roles.  
Even if pregnancy did not constitute sex discrimination, plaintiffs 
sought to establish that the differential treatment of pregnancy and 
temporary disability should not pass rational basis scrutiny. To analogize 
between pregnancy and temporary disabilities, the plaintiffs’ brief stressed 
the involuntary and unplanned character of pregnancy. The brief also 
emphasized the fallibility of contraceptives, many women’s religious and 
philosophical objections to abortion, and medical contraindications to 
abortion.
154
 Just as the women’s movement had gained constitutional 
freedoms from state regulation of birth control and abortion, legal and 
labor feminists faced the strategic need to emphasize women’s lack of 
control over their reproductive capacities.  
Advocates for women’s employment opportunity also began to couple 
sex-egalitarian arguments with arguments about the social value of 
 
 
 151. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 147, at 21–23. 
 152. Id. at 30. 
 153. Appellees’ Brief, Geduldig, supra note 112, at 24.  
 154. Id. at 68–70. An amicus brief by the IUE admonished that “there are a variety of medical 
reasons to advise against abortion . . . . [C]omplications of infection of the uterine tract, perforation of 
the uterus with a subsequent necessary hysterectomy, or psychological problems may occur.” IUE 
Brief, Geduldig, supra note 82, at 69. 
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childbearing. An amicus brief submitted by the EEOC reasoned that 
although any individual woman’s decision to become pregnant at a given 
point in time may be voluntary, “the procreation of the species—is not.”155 
The EEOC implied that society needed women to get pregnant to 
reproduce the next generation of workers and citizens. As a matter of 
social reality, the conceptual distinction between pregnancy and sex 
notwithstanding, women needed to get pregnant. The EEOC concluded 
that if pregnancy did not truly represent a choice for women, then 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constituted discrimination on the 
basis of sex. The EEOC exemplified neomaternal argumentation in its use 
of the social value of childbearing to advance women’s equal employment 
opportunity. 
The opposing sides in Aiello therefore drew dramatically different 
pictures of the relationship between pregnancy, sex, and gender identity. 
One side disaggregated pregnancy and gender identity, emphasized the 
voluntary character of pregnancy, and depicted reproduction as a private 
choice. The other argued that reproductive capacity defined gender 
identity, emphasized the involuntary character of pregnancy, and depicted 
reproduction as a service to society. From today’s vantage point, the first 
set of arguments sound feminist and the second resonate with social 
conservatism. The pregnancy discrimination debates in the 1970s, 
however, confound contemporary intuitions. The history reveals that state 
governments and business interests adopted the legal frame of 
reproductive choice to justify privatizing the costs of reproduction. 
Feminist, labor, and civil rights groups could not simply counter this 
argument with a claim to equal treatment and challenges to sex-role 
stereotypes. Instead, they needed to emphasize the connections between 
pregnancy and gender identity as well as the public nature of reproduction. 
The Aiello litigation did not pit traditional gender ideologies against anti-
stereotyping so much as market libertarian against neomaternal 
interpretations of sex equality. 
D. The Supreme Court Affirms a Market Libertarian Interpretation of Sex 
Equality 
The Court in Geduldig v. Aiello
156
 held that the exclusion of pregnancy 
from California’s temporary disability insurance plan did not violate the 
 
 
 155. EEOC Brief, Geduldig, supra note 144, at 11. 
 156. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).  
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Equal Protection Clause.
157
 Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the 
pregnancy-based exclusion discriminated on the basis of sex. In a 
footnote, Stewart’s opinion explained that California did not “exclude 
anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely remove[d] 
. . . pregnancy . . . from the list of compensable disabilities.”158 
California’s program divided the state’s workers into “pregnant women 
and nonpregnant persons.”159 While only women comprised the first 
group, both men and women comprised the second group accruing the 
program’s benefits.160  
Geduldig represented a sea change in the constitutional construction of 
gender.
161
 For a half century since the New Deal, women’s reproductive 
capacity and social role as mothers had formed the basis for sex-
differentiated labor regulations. Now the Court held that disparate 
treatment of actual pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.
162
 Although feminist legal scholars have long criticized 
Geduldig,
163
 the critical distance provided by a historical viewpoint reveals 
greater historical complexity. The Court had traversed the distance from 
West Coast Hotel to Geduldig powered, in part, by feminists’ legal 
victories.
164
 The holding in Geduldig distinguished between pregnancy and 
 
 
 157. Id. at 494–95. 
 158. Id. at 496 n.20.  
 159. Id. at 496–97 n.20. 
 160. Id. at 496. 
 161. Technically, the doctrinal holdings of Geduldig did not conflict with those of Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Muller and 
West Coast Hotel only held that states had the power to enact labor laws protecting women workers; 
these decisions did not require protections for pregnant workers Muller, 208 U.S. at 422–23; West 
Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398–400. Likewise, Geduldig did not forbid states from including coverage 
for pregnancy within temporary disability insurance plans; it only held that the Constitution did not 
require this coverage. Moreover, the Court decided Muller and West Coast Hotel under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Muller, 208 U.S. at 417; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 
391. The question in these cases was whether protective labor laws for women violated substantive 
due process by restricting women workers’ freedom of contract. By contrast, the Court decided 
Geduldig under the Equal Protection Clause. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494. My argument that Geduldig 
represented a sea change in constitutional jurisprudence, however, operates at the level of social 
meaning rather than formal doctrine. 
 162. The holding in Geduldig applied to the exclusion from the state disability insurance plan of 
routine pregnancies absent extraordinary complications. Prior to the district court decision in 
Geduldig, the California Court of Appeals held that the relevant statute did not foreclose disability 
benefit payments that related to medical complications arising during pregnancy. Geduldig, 417 U.S. 
at 490 (citing Rentzer v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973)). 
 163. One scholar noted a decade after the opinion that criticizing Geduldig had become a “cottage 
industry.” Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983 (1984). 
 164. Advances in reproductive rights lent coherence to the easy distinction drawn by the Court 
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gender identity in a manner that resonated with both feminists’ anti-
stereotyping claims and the state and business lobby’s arguments in favor 
of private responsibility for the costs of reproduction.  
The Court’s holding in Geduldig foreclosed the use of sex 
discrimination law to expand social insurance protections for pregnant 
workers.
165
 First, Geduldig formed part of a several-year trend on the 
Burger Court to cut off the expansion of constitutional rights at the border 
of the social-welfare state. In conducting rational basis review of 
California’s pregnancy exclusion,166 the Court cited recent decisions 
rejecting equal protection challenges to social welfare regulations.
167
 The 
majority opinion similarly portrayed California’s temporary disability 
insurance program as a social program, which the state legislature had 
broad discretion to design, and the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage 
not as sex discrimination but as a legitimate cost-saving measure. 
Geduldig helped close the door on a moment of possibility for the 
constitutionalization of welfare rights.  
Second, Geduldig foreshadowed the Court’s evisceration of disparate-
impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause in its 1976 Washington v. 
Davis decision.
168
 Geduldig did not explicitly foreclose a constitutional 
disparate-impact claim. In distinguishing between pregnancy and sex-
based discrimination, however, the Court ignored the undeniable negative 
effect that California’s pregnancy exclusion had on women workers alone. 
In addition to reinforcing sex-role stereotypes, Geduldig thus also 
 
 
between the category “women” and the category “pregnant persons.” Of course, women exerted 
control over their reproductive lives absent legal rights to birth control and abortion. LINDA GORDON, 
THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA, 55–294 
(3d ed. 2002) (analyzing movements for reproductive control prior to second-wave feminist movement 
advocacy for legalized abortion). Still, these rights enhanced women’s reproductive autonomy. Id. at 
315 (discussing a study that attributed seventy-five percent of the late twentieth century decline in 
birth rates to increased use of contraception). 
 165. We can contrast the holding in Geduldig with that in the 1974 case of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973), which struck down pregnancy dismissal policies. While LaFleur 
forced employers to comport with market rational policies, the equal-treatment claim in Geduldig 
would force states and potentially employers to assume a greater cost burden. 
 166. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494–95. Once the majority dispatched with the argument in Geduldig 
that the pregnancy exclusion classified on the basis of sex, it needed only to accord rational basis 
review to California’s plan. Id. 
 167. Id. at 495 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970) (rejecting an equal 
protection challenge to state caps on monthly public assistance payments under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to a state’s mechanism for public assistance grants that met a lesser percentage of need for 
AFDC recipients than for other assistance recipients)). 
 168. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
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precluded plaintiffs’ use of equal protection doctrine to realize affirmative 
economic entitlements that would advance gender equality.  
Geduldig painfully highlighted the predicament of feminist legal 
advocacy. The claim to pregnancy disability benefits represented a 
synthesis of feminist commitments to end sex-role stereotypes and to 
spread the costs of reproduction across society. In the course of litigation, 
feminists needed to articulate this objective by fitting their claim within 
existing legal frames. They used liberal individualist principles to 
challenge the gender bias that underpinned the exclusion of pregnancy 
from insurance coverage. When feminists confronted the limits of this 
strategy–its intellectual overlap with the market libertarian construction of 
reproduction as a private choice—they drew upon neomaternal arguments 
about the social value of reproduction. The Court, however, affirmed a 
market libertarian conception of sex equality that reinforced the anti-
stereotyping strain of feminist legal argumentation while marginalizing the 
neomaternal strain. Existing constitutional discourses had proven 
inadequate tools for feminists to demonstrate the connection between sex 
equality and societal rather than individualized responsibility for the costs 
of reproduction. 
E. Gilbert and a Changed Labor Market   
In deciding Geduldig under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court was 
also looking sidewise and, possibly, ahead to a Title VII case: General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert. The case that began with the activism of IUE 
members working at the General Electric plant in Salem was winding its 
way through the courts. Only two months before Geduldig, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had ruled in favor of the 
Gilbert plaintiffs.
169
 At a moment of fluidity between constitutional and 
statutory definitions of sex equality, the Court anticipated that its ruling 
under the Equal Protection Clause would likely affect lower courts’ 
interpretation of employers’ duties under Title VII. In its 1976 Gilbert 
ruling, the Court imported a market libertarian interpretation of sex 
equality from the constitutional to the statutory context.
170
  
 
 
 169. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
 170. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
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The same six Justices who had formed the majority in Geduldig did so 
again in the Gilbert decision.
171
 Writing for the majority,
172
 Justice 
Rehnquist held that the logic of Geduldig—that classifications on the basis 
of pregnancy did not discriminate on the basis of sex—also applied under 
Title VII.
173
 Furthermore, as in Geduldig, the plaintiffs in the instant case 
had failed to show that the exclusion of pregnancy served as a pretext for 
invidious discrimination.
174
 Pregnancy’s significant differences “from the 
typical covered disease or disability,” namely its voluntary character, 
made its exclusion rational.
175
  
Once the Court disposed of the claim that the pregnancy exclusion 
constituted per se sex discrimination, disparate impact liability became the 
major point of contention between the Justices. Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion concluded that the pregnancy exclusion did not have a disparate 
effect on women because the plaintiffs had not proven that women 
received lesser net benefits under the General Electric plan. The opinion 
went further, however, to threaten the ongoing vitality of disparate-impact 
liability under Title VII altogether. That implication alarmed both feminist 
and civil rights groups.
176
 
Gilbert portended to undermine the salutary effect that the guidelines 
already had on employer policies. In 1965, sixty percent of employers did 
not offer even unpaid maternity leaves but rather fired pregnant women. 
 
 
 171. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1307, 1358–66 (2012) (arguing that Gilbert formed part of the courts’ invention of an 
anticlassification tradition interpreting Title VII to prohibit only those employment practices that 
divide males and females into wholly sex-differentiated groups). 
 172. The Court heard oral argument in Gilbert twice. In the 1975 term, Blackmun had sat out on 
the arguments and the Court deadlocked on the case 4–4, with Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, and White 
voting for the defendants and Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens voting for the plaintiffs. In 
1976, Blackmun participated when the Court heard the case on re-argument and placed his vote on the 
side of the defendants. Powell also switched his vote to join the majority. Harry A. Blackmun 
Conference Notes (Jan. 21, 1976) (on file with the Library of Cong., Harry A. Blackmun Papers 
[hereinafter Blackmun Papers]), Box 238, Folder: Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert).   
 173. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135–36. 
 174. The opinion ruled that the 1972 EEOC guidelines defining pregnancy as a temporary 
disability were not entitled to deference because they were enacted eight years after the passage of 
Title VII and represented an abrupt departure from earlier guidelines. Id. at 141–45. The majority’s 
conclusions rested on a mistaken assumption that the 1972 guidelines were sudden and not thoroughly 
deliberated. In reality, the EEOC’s position on pregnancy had gradually evolved over eight years in 
response to external feminist pressure and internal debate within the agency. Kevin Schwartz, 
Equalizing Pregnancy: The Birth of a Super-Statute 9–32 (2005), available at http://digitalcommons 
.law.yale.edu/ ylsspps_papers/41. 
 175. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136.  
 176. For a more comprehensive discussion of legal battles about disparate-impact liability in 
relation to Gilbert, see SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 110–15 (2011). 
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Of the forty percent of employers who provided leave, only one-fifth 
allowed women themselves to decide how long to work. The rest forced 
women to take mandatory leaves at designated points in their 
pregnancy.
177
 A mere six percent of employers allowed women to use sick 
leave benefits to replace lost income during pregnancy-related illnesses or 
disabilities.
178
 By 1973, one year after the passage of the EEOC guidelines 
on pregnancy discrimination, three-quarters of companies surveyed by 
Prentice-Hall offered maternity leave and sixty percent allowed women to 
determine the timing and duration of these leaves.
179
 The proportion of 
firms offering sick pay for pregnancy disabilities had risen to twenty-one 
percent.
180
  
Feminist lawyers feared that Gilbert, by declining to defer to the EEOC 
guidelines, threatened the gains that women had made when employers 
thought these guidelines reflected the state of the law. In actuality, the 
available evidence suggests that the Court’s ruling in Gilbert did not 
entirely stop the trend toward greater coverage of pregnancy under 
employer fringe benefit programs.
181
 But it likely substantially slowed 
down the rate of change of employer behavior.  
 
 
 177. Prentice Hall, Personnel Management—Policies and Practices Report Bull. 24, Do Your 
Maternity Leave Policies Conform to EEOC Guidelines? Commission Decisions Offer Pointers, at 457 
(on file with the IUE Records, Box 242, Folder: Maternity Leave Policies Due for a Change).  
 178. LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, PUB. L. NO. 95-555, 
prepared for S. COMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., at 62 (1979) [hereinafter PDA 
LEGIS. HISTORY]. 
 179. Prentice Hall surveyed 929 companies across the country to identify trends in maternity 
leaves. Although the precise methodology is not clear, the survey was likely weighted toward larger 
employers rather than a random selection of companies. Prentice Hall, supra note 177, at 457. 
 180. Id. at 460. 
 181. The Institute for Social Research conducted a Quality of Employment Survey in 1977, one 
year after the Gilbert decision and before any legislative response overriding the decision. Had 
employers responded to Gilbert by ending policies that they previously believed to be mandatory 
under EEOC guidelines, one would expect a decline in the rates of employer provision of job-
guaranteed maternity leave as well as maternity leaves with pay. Instead, one sees a continuing 
increase in the provision of maternity leaves and income replacement consistent with the trend 
established in the period from 1965 to 1973. In 1977, seventy-four percent of survey respondents 
indicated that they were entitled to maternity leave with re-employment rights and twenty-nine percent 
of respondents responded that they were entitled to maternity leave with pay. ROBERT P. QUINN & 
GRAHAM L. STAINES, THE 1977 QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT SURVEY: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, WITH 
COMPARISON DATA FROM THE 1969–70 AND THE 1972–73 SURVEYS 58 (1979). 
 The historical analysis here is based on imperfect data. Prentice Hall, supra note 177, surveyed 
firms, whereas the Quality of Employment study surveyed female workers. The data cannot be 
compared directly because of the variations in rates of maternity leave provision among firms of 
different sizes. Specifically, rates of maternity leave provision increased with size of the firm. For 
example, in 1977, only thirty-nine percent of firms with between one and nine employees offered 
maternity leave with reemployment rights, compared to eighty-nine percent of firms with five-hundred 
or more employees. Nonetheless, the data is sufficiently developed to support the point that firms did 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
494 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:453 
 
 
 
 
The Gilbert decision threw into sharp relief the difficulty of convincing 
courts, as opposed to legislatures, that economic justice was a critical 
component of sex equality. In reaction to the decision, labor feminist Olga 
Madar pointed out that collective bargaining could not mitigate the 
consequences of Gilbert for millions of nonunionized women.
182
 In part as 
a result of this decline in bargaining power and reach, women’s rights 
activists in unions had turned to antidiscrimination law as a way to fight 
for coverage for pregnancy under disability and health insurance plans. 
The courts, however, were inclined toward liberal individualist categories 
and were thus more receptive to anti-stereotyping arguments that stopped 
short of calling for the just allocation of economic burdens and benefits. 
The courts, therefore, were not the legal institutions most amenable to the 
campaign for pregnancy disability benefits. Congressional advocacy 
provided a new opportunity to make the argument that the transformation 
in gender roles depended on a just distribution of the costs of reproduction. 
III. NEOMATERNAL POLITICS: THE CONTROVERSY IN CONGRESS 
Part III traces the ascendance of neomaternal politics in Congressional 
debates over the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Part III.A 
analyzes how anti-abortion activists made arguments for the PDA based 
on the need to protect childbearing women. Advocacy by anti-abortion 
activists for the PDA against the business lobby’s opposition illustrates the 
tenuous character of the Republican alliance between market and social 
conservatism, as late as 1978. In the 1972 presidential election campaign, 
Republican strategists had used the abortion issue to chip away at the New 
Deal coalition of blue-collar workers, labor unions, African-Americans, 
and religious and ethnic minorities. These strategists had attempted to use 
social disagreement on issues of sex and gender, as well as race, to attract 
Catholics, southerners, and social conservatives to the Republican Party.
183
 
But the alignment between the pro-business and socially conservative 
elements of the Republican Party did not coalesce fully in the 1970s. This 
history helps to explain why some anti-abortion activists came to embrace 
 
 
not immediately respond to Gilbert by taking away the benefits they had extended over the course of 
the prior decade. 
 182. Press Release, Coalition of Labor Union Women Criticizes Supreme Court Decision 
Depriving Women of Equitable Sick and Accident Benefit (on file with Wayne State Univ., Walter P. 
Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Coal. of Labor Union Women Records, [hereinafter 
CLUW Records] Box 16, Folder 7).  
 183. Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions about 
Backlash, 120 YALE. L.J. 2028, 2052–71 (2011). 
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equal employment opportunity for women, even as they took a socially 
conservative position on abortion. Not until the mid-1980s would the anti-
abortion movement—influenced by Protestant fundamentalism—take 
strongly conservative stances on sexuality, marriage, and the family.
184
 
Part III.B shows that in the legislative campaign for the PDA, legal and 
labor feminists, too, made neomaternal arguments. Feminists increasingly 
coupled anti-stereotyping arguments for pregnancy disability benefits with 
arguments depicting pregnancy as a form of socially valuable labor. These 
arguments resonated with the rhetoric of early-twentieth century reformers 
but feminist advocacy for the PDA differed ideologically from earlier 
maternalism. Instead of arguing for differential treatment of women as a 
group defined by gender status, feminist advocates argued for equal 
treatment of pregnant women. Instead of arguing that women’s 
reproductive capacity justified the protection of women, advocates argued 
that pregnancy’s economic and societal value justified making it a 
collective, societal responsibility. Neomaternal arguments wielded by both 
anti-abortion activists and feminists helped to overcome the business 
lobby’s market libertarian opposition to the PDA.  
Part III.C shows how the neomaternal construction of the PDA’s 
meaning contributed to the passage of the PDA. The construction of the 
bill as legislation that would support women’s decisions to bear children 
enhanced its political popularity. Liberal politicians who supported 
abortion rights nonetheless framed the PDA as legislation that would 
protect the decision whether to bear a child from the harsh calculus of the 
marketplace. Furthermore, the construction of the PDA as a “pro-life” bill 
split the loyalties of Republican Congressmembers between fiscal and 
social conservatism.  
Social anxieties about race contributed to a political environment 
receptive to neomaternal policies. Although the PDA was formally race 
neutral, racial and gender ideologies were intertwined in the politics 
surrounding the bill. Historian Ruth Feldstein argues that from the New 
Deal to the mid-1960s liberal political actors deployed conservative ideas 
about gender and mothers, in particular, to advance racial liberalism.
185
 
The late 1970s debates about the PDA saw the inverse. Conservative racial 
ideologies shaped receptivity to liberal antidiscrimination laws that also 
affirmed neomaternal commitments. 
 
 
 184. See Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise: Antiabortion Moderates After Roe v. 
Wade, 1973–1980, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 587–90 (2012). 
 185. RUTH FELDSTEIN, MOTHERHOOD IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SEX IN AMERICAN 
LIBERALISM, 1930–1965, at 4–5 (2000). 
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As Part III.D demonstrates, the neomaternal construction of the PDA 
facilitated the enactment of an anti-abortion rider. The anti-abortion rider 
created an asymmetry in the design of the PDA: the statute spreads the 
costs of pregnancy across employees and employers but reinforces the 
legal construction of abortion as the private economic burden of individual 
women. As enacted, the bill affirmed women’s right to economic support 
for childbearing but not for women’s exercise of their right to abortion. 
A. “Roe v. Wade Set the Precedent”: Anti-Abortion Advocacy for the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
The legislative debate about the PDA witnessed renewed conflict 
between feminist advocates and the business lobby. Ruth Weyand, the 
IUE attorney who had litigated Gilbert, and Susan Deller Ross, the 
attorney who as a staff member at the EEOC had helped to persuade the 
agency to adopt the temporary disability paradigm for pregnancy, co-
chaired the Campaign to End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers. 
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the Campaign lobbied Congress to 
pass the PDA, which would amend Title VII to define pregnancy 
discrimination as unlawful sex discrimination. The Campaign ultimately 
amassed the support of over two hundred organizations and sustained 
legislative advocacy for twenty-one months, from December 1976 through 
August 1978.
186
 
Trade associations continued to mobilize against the PDA by 
emphasizing the bill’s costs to employers.187 The business lobby argued 
that employers should not have to take responsibility for these costs.
188
 
Drawing on market libertarian logic, the business lobby suggested that the 
costs of reproduction naturally rested within the private family. “[T]he 
 
 
 186. Peggy Simpson, Pregnant Workers Have a Tough Ally, PARADE, May 20, 1979, at 31, (on 
file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Inst., Harvard Univ., Women’s Equity Action League 
Records, Box 4, Folder 59). 
 187. An actuary testifying on behalf of insurance industry associations estimated that additional 
pregnancy disability benefits would cost $0.5 billion per year and that medical benefits related to 
pregnancy and childbirth would cost $0.8 billion. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the 
Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and 6705 Before the Subcomm. on Employment 
Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 95th Cong. 107 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. 6075 
Hearings] (Testimony of Peter M. Thexton). 
 188. On occasion, businesses repeated arguments in legislative hearings that appealed to 
traditional gender roles by representing women as secondary labor force participants. The National 
Retail Merchants Association, for example, testified in Congress that women did not merit pregnancy 
disability benefits because they were “not the primary breadwinners in their families, but [were] 
people who [took] jobs . . . to supplement the family’s primary source of income or to earn extra 
spending money.” H.R. 6075 Hearings, supra note 187, at 255. 
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essential question in consideration,” according to the National Association 
of Manufacturers (“NAM”), did not involve sex discrimination but rather 
how far Congress wanted “to go in subsidizing parenthood.”189 The PDA 
went “too far in requiring employers to assume the economic 
responsibilities of parenthood.”190 In portraying the PDA as an attempt to 
subsidize the costs of reproduction rather than to remedy sex 
discrimination,
191
 NAM implicitly interpreted the Act’s legal requirements 
quite broadly. The PDA set a baseline requirement that if employer fringe 
benefit plans offered health and other benefits related to temporary 
disability, then the employer could not exclude pregnancy. Only if 
disparate-impact liability enabled plaintiffs to change this baseline, would 
the PDA more dramatically shift the costs of pregnancy and childbirth 
from individual women to employers.
192
 
Some social conservatives joined the business lobby in applauding 
Gilbert and opposing the PDA. For these social conservatives, Gilbert 
correctly affirmed women’s place in the home rather than the workplace. 
Phyllis Schlafly, the prominent conservative activist who led the STOP 
ERA campaign in the states, argued: “Pregnancy is a privilege and a right, 
but you can’t make industry or government pay for it.”193 To buttress her 
argument about the just allocation of the costs of pregnancy, Schlafly 
 
 
 189. S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 94. 
 190. Id. at 97.  
 191. NAM suggested that if Congress desired to augment economic protections for childbearing 
women, then it should do so within the framework of legislation regulating employment, such as the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and not by amending Title VII. Id. at 89 (Testimony of 
Francis T. Coleman, attorney on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers). Amendments to 
ERISA would have required equal coverage of pregnancy under temporary disability benefits, but 
ERISA itself “does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself 
proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.” See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (holding that for the period prior to the enactment of the PDA, ERISA preempted a 
state human rights law that required equal coverage of pregnancy under employer benefit plans). The 
biggest difference between the PDA and any potential ERISA amendments would concern not benefit 
coverage, but the PDA’s prohibition on discrimination employment opportunities. The PDA and not 
ERISA amendments would render unlawful discrimination in hiring, promotion, and other 
employment opportunities on the basis of pregnancy and related medical conditions. This suggests that 
perhaps the business trade associations were in actuality less concerned about the cost of pregnancy 
disability benefits than about the threat of litigation challenging pregnancy discrimination in 
employment decisions.  
 192. The claim that the PDA would shift the costs of reproduction to employers overstated the 
case in another way. Decades later, legal scholar Christine Jolls observed that in some contexts 
employers would pass the cost of pregnancy disability benefits or other sex-based accommodations 
back onto women in the form of reduced wages or diminished employment levels. That dynamic 
occurs in sex-segregated workplaces or in sex-integrated workforces absent the enforcement of sex 
discrimination prohibitions. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 
(2000). 
 193. Joseph Sjostrom, Women Hit Ruling on Maternity Aid, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1976, at 18. 
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appealed to the family-wage ideal: “Disability benefits are supposed to pay 
the lost wages of the family provider.”194 Schlafly thus suggested that 
women are not breadwinners. She argued further that government and 
employers should not replace the role of men as providers. Neither 
government nor employers paid for the pregnancies of women who stayed 
in the home, Schlafly reasoned; neither should they pay for the 
pregnancies of employed women.
195
  
While the business lobby and some social conservatives opposed the 
PDA, feminists found a new ally in some anti-abortion organizations. At 
the time that Congress began to debate the PDA, anti-abortion activists 
evinced a relatively broad spectrum of political ideologies. Some, like 
Schlafly, opposed both abortion and pregnancy discrimination benefits on 
the basis that they disrupted traditional gender roles. Other organizations, 
however, both took an anti-abortion stance and supported legislation that 
challenged traditional gender and sexual ideologies.
196
  
American Citizens Concerned for Life (“ACCL”) exemplified anti-
abortion advocacy in favor of neomaternal social policy. Marjory 
Mecklenburg and Judith Fink founded ACCL in 1974.
197
 The two women 
wanted to create an organization that was more liberal than the National 
Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”) on the issues of sex education, family 
planning, and public welfare for single mothers. The ACCL’s support for 
these policies advanced sex equality by giving women control over their 
sexual lives, by challenging the feminization of poverty, and by enhancing 
women’s economic autonomy.198 ACCL retained significant influence 
over the NLRC during the early 1970s. In the latter half of the decade, 
however, the organization lost power within the broader anti-abortion 
movement as a result of several factors. These factors included: the 
increased involvement of anti-feminist organizations in the movement; its 
deepening ties to New Right and Religious Right political mobilization; 
and the rhetoric of feminist activists who described anti-abortion activists 
as inherently anti-feminist.
199
  
Mecklenburg and Fink believed that the best strategy to combat 
abortion was to prevent unwanted pregnancies. As Mary Ziegler explains, 
ACCL held the “philosophy . . . that fetal rights could be protected only if 
 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  
 196. See Ziegler, supra note 184, at 574. 
 197. Id. at 578. 
 198. Id. at 579–82.  
 199. Id. at 584–89; see generally Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and 
Stakes of Modern Pro-Life Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232 (2013).  
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women were themselves guaranteed better legal and economic 
opportunities.”200 ACCL leaders sought to balance the rights of women 
and the rights of fetuses not only by campaigning against abortion but also 
by advocating public health services for pregnant women.
201
 They 
believed that in the absence of such supportive services, society 
metaphorically “aborted” women via a form of structural violence that in 
turn generated the abortions of fetuses.
202
 ACCL pursued a neomaternal 
agenda that involved protection for women and fetuses beyond 
prohibitions on abortion.  
In March 1977, ACCL issued a press release criticizing the Gilbert 
decision. ACCL objected to businesses’ use of reproductive choice 
discourse to justify private responsibility for the costs of reproduction. The 
organization’s press release on Gilbert stated: “The attorneys for General 
Electric took the position that women employees should be willing to end 
the lives of their unborn children if they were financially unable to 
withstand a period of wage loss.”203 The press release drew a parallel 
between the libertarian stance of the business lobby regarding the 
allocation of the costs of pregnancy and the strain of liberalism that 
underpinned the abortion right: “ACCL maintains that the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its Roe v. Wade decision of 1973 legalizing abortion set the 
precedent for the General Electric argument that continuation of 
pregnancy is completely voluntary and that businesses need not reimburse 
women for time lost from work due to maternity.”204 Both Gilbert and Roe 
had drawn on notions of privacy and choice, in ACCL’s view, to the 
detriment of motherhood.  
To some feminist activists’ surprise, anti-abortion activists attended 
several of the meetings of the Campaign to End Discrimination Against 
Pregnant Workers.
205
 ACCL joined the coalition because pregnancy 
 
 
 200. Ziegler, supra note 184, at 578–79. 
 201. Id. at 579–81.  
 202. Thomas W. Hilgers et al., Is Abortion the Best We Have to Offer? A Challenge to the 
Aborting Society, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 177, 179 (Thomas W. Hilgers, M.D. & Dennis J. 
Horan, Esq. eds., 1972) (on file with the, Georgetown Univ. Bioethics Research Library, Andre E. 
Hellegers File, [hereinafter AEH File]). 
 203. Press Release 2, Judith Fink, American Citizens Concerned for Life, Pro-Life Group Says 
Gen. Elec. Corp. “Encourages Abortion” in Gilbert Case; Calls for Support of Legislation to Provide 
Pregnancy Disability Payments (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with the Gerald R. Ford Library, American 
Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Records, 1972-1986 [hereinafter ACCL Records], Box 26, Folder: 
ACCL Position on Pregnancy Disability Bill, March 8, 1978). 
 204. Id.   
 205. Transcript of Interview with Wendy W. Williams, Professor emerita, Georgetown Univ. Law 
Ctr., in Washington, D.C. at 24 (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Williams] (on file with 
author). 
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disability benefits held “obvious potential for removing pressure on 
pregnant women to seek abortions (which usually are covered by 
employer medical insurance plans).”206 At the state level, ACCL and other 
anti-abortion advocates mobilized in Minnesota, Maine, and Maryland to 
support legislation that would provide pregnancy disability or maternity 
leave to female employees.
207
 The National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops also testified on behalf of the PDA, viewing the legislation as an 
incentive to women’s decision to become mothers.208 
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel for ACCL, testified before 
Congress on behalf of the PDA. Nolan-Haley criticized Gilbert as a denial 
of “economic equality” to pregnant workers that made a woman’s 
“decision to abort” not “the product of free choice but of economic 
coercion.”209 ACCL interpreted the subjection of “unborn human life . . . 
[to] a cost/benefit analysis . . . uniquely degrading to human life and 
human dignity.”210 Furthermore, the decision symbolically undermined the 
“value of children” by turning them into “‘affordable’ and ‘non-
affordable’ commodities.”211 Nolan-Haley’s testimony echoed feminists’ 
affirmative vision of reproductive choice. She argued that women had a 
right to the economic resources necessary to have wanted children. In 
contrast to feminists, however, ACCL did not view reproductive choice to 
also include the legal right and economic resources to terminate a 
pregnancy. Thus, ACCL constructed childbearing as a normative social 
role for women, even as the group challenged law that privatized the costs 
of pregnancy within the family.  
The most prominent Catholic voice on behalf of the PDA came from 
Andre E. Hellegers, the founder and director of the Joseph and Rose 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University.
212
 Hellegers had 
already achieved national recognition as a leading authority on fetal 
 
 
 206. Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg, President, Am. Citizens Concerned for Life, to Pro-Life 
Leaders and News Media Reps. (Mar. 1978) (on file with the ACCL Records, Box 26, Folder: ACCL 
Position on Pregnancy Disability Bill, March 8, 1978). 
 207. Legis. Bulletin, Am. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc., Pregnancy Disability Benefits Bill, 
S.995 & H.R. 5055 (May 9, 1977) (on file with the ACCL Records, Box 27, Folder: Legislative 
Bulletin, May 9, 1977). 
 208. See S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 495–96 (Letter from Msgr. James T. McHugh to the 
Honorable Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (Apr. 22, 1977)).  
 209. Id. at 436–37 (Statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, Am. Citizens 
Concerned for Life, Inc.). 
 210. Id. at 437.  
 211. Id. at 438.  
 212. When it opened in 1971, the Institute was originally called The Joseph and Rose Kennedy 
Center for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics. Within a few years, it changed to its 
current name. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 23 (1998). 
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physiology and maternal-child medical care when he founded the Kennedy 
Institute in 1971.
213
 Hellegers held non-orthodox ideas on birth control and 
advocated greater freedom for Catholics to perform family planning;
214
 
nonetheless, he shared the dominant Catholic position on abortion. Since 
the early 1970s, Hellegers had testified in court cases and in Congress in 
opposition to abortion.
215
 He critiqued the Supreme Court’s refusal in Roe 
to state when human life began, arguing that the Court had confused a 
biological with a social and moral determination. As a biological matter, 
Hellegers argued that human life began at conception. The question—one 
that needed to be answered philosophically rather than scientifically—was 
when to accord life moral value and dignity.
216
  
Hellegers’ opposition to abortion did not represent a unique aspect of 
his theological perspective, but rather exemplified his moral stance 
regarding broader trends in medicine. Hellegers drew attention to the fact 
that the Court in Roe, in discussing a woman’s interest in her own health, 
had adopted the World Health Organization’s definition of health as “a 
sense of well-being.”217 For Hellegers, such an “affective” definition of 
health threatened to eclipse the experience of suffering and the concept of 
sin, central to Catholicism.
218
 Hellegers also critiqued a shift in medical 
care toward cost-benefit analyses that jeopardized those who would 
disproportionately tax resources.
219
 That the “right” of a fetus to be born 
might depend on the degree of its parents’ desire for a child exemplified 
 
 
 213. Colman McCarthy, Medical Ethics Pioneer Dr. Andre Hellegers Dies, WASH. POST, May 9, 
1979, at B6 (on file with the AEH File). 
 214. He conducted a theological inquiry that concluded that persons incapable of full cognitive 
consent to sex might use birth control. An Interview With Dr. Andre Hellegers, 24 GEO. MED. BULL. 3, 
4–5 (1971) (on file with the AEH File). His research resulted in his appointment to a papal 
commission that ultimately recommended greater freedom for Catholics in family planning. When 
Pope Paul VI issued an encyclical in 1968 prohibiting birth control against the commission’s 
recommendation, Hellegers denounced as “basically irrational” the Pope’s request that scientists 
instead perfect the rhythm method. Dr. Hellegers Disagrees, BALT. CATH. REV., Aug. 9, 1968 (on file 
with the AEH File). President Johnson subsequently appointed Hellegers to a commission on 
Population and Birth Control in 1968. McCarthy, supra note 213; LBJ Appoints Panel For Birth Curb 
Study, PILOT, July 27, 1968 (on file with the AEH File). 
 215. See Abortion Hearing Gets View of 8 Catholic Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1970, at A26; 
120 Cong. Rec. 120 14280–81 (1974). 
 216. Andre Hellegers, M.D., Wade and Bolton: A Medical Critique, 19 CATH. LAW. 251, 254–55 
(1973) (on file with the AEH File); Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., The Beginnings of Personhood: 
Medical Considerations, 27 PERKINS J. 11, 11–14 (1973) (on file with the AEH File). 
 217. Hellegers, Wade and Bolton, supra note 216, at 258. 
 218. Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., ‘Affective’ Medical Care, OB. GYN. NEWS, Jan. 15, 1976, at 4 (on 
file with the AEH File).  
 219. Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., Concept of ‘Health Right’ Possible Pandora’s Box, OB. GYN. 
NEWS, Apr. 15, 1973, at 52–53 (on file with the AEH File). 
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this shift.
220
 Thus, Hellegers’ opposition to abortion both informed and 
derived from his larger critique of medical trends toward the subjective, 
utilitarian, and secular.  
Hellegers’ ethical commitment to fetal life had embroiled him in the 
early 1970s litigation challenging pregnancy discrimination in the 
workplace. Hellegers believed that pregnant women needed income 
security to bring their pregnancies to term and to maintain fetal health. 
Hellegers was a cultural traditionalist “still influenced by the old notion 
that pregnant women should be sat down in easy chairs with feet up and 
drink lots of milk.”221 Nevertheless, Hellegers also accepted the new 
economic reality that a significant proportion of pregnant women relied on 
their own salaries for essential income.
222
 
Motivated by his religious commitment to advocate equal employment 
opportunity for childbearing women, Hellegers served as an expert witness 
on behalf of the IUE before the district court in the Gilbert litigation. 
Given that pregnant women needed to work, Hellegers saw a need for 
antidiscrimination law that would protect their economic security. He 
testified that pregnancy was appropriately classified as a temporary 
disability.
223
 Hellegers had the “uneasy feeling” that his testimony in 
Gilbert might “affect the lives of more fetuses, for good or ill, than [he] 
could affect by working day and night on a delivery floor.”224 Hellegers 
exemplified the potential for anti-abortion advocates to ally with feminists 
on the issue of pregnancy disability benefits.  
After the Supreme Court rejected the temporary disability analogy in 
Geduldig and Gilbert, Hellegers again made his case, this time in 
Congress. In testimony on behalf of the PDA, he admonished: “[T]he logic 
of the Supreme Court really escapes me as a physician.”225 Because the 
Court “does not know when human life begins . . . it has ruled that you 
 
 
 220. Id. at 53; Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., Abortions Ruling Puzzle, OB. GYN. NEWS, May 15, 
1975, at 15 (on file with the AEH File). 
 221. Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., Should Pregnant Women Work?, OB. GYN. NEWS, Sept. 1, 1976, 
at 29 (on file with the AEH File). 
 222. Id.  
 223. Hellegers testified that although women exerted control over their reproductive capacity by 
planning their pregnancies, pregnancy remained a less than entirely voluntary condition because of the 
failure rates of and contradictions to oral contraceptives as well as abortion. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
375 F. Supp. 367, 375 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 1974). Hellegers testified further that conditions accompanying 
pregnancy, including miscarriages and complications such as hypertension, comported with the 
medical definition of disease. Id. at 375–76, 377. 
 224. Hellegers, supra note 221, at 29. 
 225. S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 65 (Statement of Andre E. Hellegers, M.D., Professor of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology and Director of the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of 
Human Reproduction and Bioethics, Georgetown University). 
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may treat the fetus in utero for abortion purposes as if it was a tumor.”226 
Yet, Hellegers lamented, “for disability benefit purposes you may not treat 
a fetus as a tumor because if it was a tumor you would qualify for the 
disability benefits.”227 In the figure of Hellegers, the argument that 
pregnancy constituted a temporary disability fused with the anti-abortion 
argument for pregnancy disability benefits. 
The debate over the PDA manifested a new awareness that the most 
fundamental reproductive activities, once unquestioned as the natural 
function of women, were now embedded in the harsh calculus of the 
marketplace. The legal rights to birth control and to abortion enabled 
women to exercise control over their own reproduction in response to 
economic pressures. Anti-abortion activists who supported the PDA 
believed the statute would help to transcend market libertarianism by 
affording pregnant women economic security. These activists’ embrace of 
equal employment opportunity thus derived from their anti-abortion 
commitments. They promoted women’s ability to reconcile motherhood 
with labor-market participation, while also reinforcing the normative 
primacy of motherhood.  
B. “Can Pregnancy be Truly Voluntary?”: Feminists Reframe Their 
Argument 
Congressional debates offered feminists greater opportunity than did 
courts to make substantive arguments for sex equality. Feminist advocates 
emphasized the ways in which pregnancy discrimination reinforced 
women’s economic inequality. Ruth Weyand made the case for the PDA 
by bringing to the fore the experience of the IUE’s female membership. 
Weyand testified that “women feel more strongly about the effect of 
pregnancy than any other form of discrimination that they incur.”228 
According to Weyand, the IUE catalogued one hundred complaints of 
pregnancy discrimination for every one complaint based on equal pay or 
other forms of sex discrimination.
229
  
Feminist advocacy for the PDA resonated with multiple positive rights 
traditions including those connected to the labor movement, welfare rights, 
socialist feminism, and progressive-era feminism. In the late twentieth 
century, socialist feminists in Europe and North America developed the 
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idea that motherhood constituted a form of economically valuable labor. In 
Italy, socialist feminists drew upon the theory of operaismo, or workerism, 
which had developed in the Italian trade union movement.
230
 Building on 
the theory of operaismo, which had spread internationally, socialist 
feminists in both Italy and the United States campaigned for salaries for 
housework. They argued that mothers benefitted the capitalist economy by 
reproducing the next generation of workers at little cost to employers or 
the state.
231
 The campaign for the PDA represented a less radical demand 
than remuneration for caregiving work in the home. Equal treatment for 
pregnancy within disability and health insurance mandates would modify 
rather than upend the privatization of dependency. Feminist advocacy for 
the PDA, however, drew upon a socialist feminist tradition that 
emphasized the economic value of reproductive labor.  
The belief that childbearing had general societal value and not merely 
personal value underpinned feminist advocates’ critique of Gilbert. A 
feminist newspaper quoted New York University Law Professor, Sylvia 
Law, who challenged the allocation of the costs of pregnancy to the 
private family. Law criticized the misguided assumption “that having 
children is a woman’s trip.”232 Law emphasized the social dimensions of 
reproduction to argue for collective responsibility for the costs of 
pregnancy and childbirth. She explained: “First of all, having children 
necessarily involves men, and secondly, providing for the next generation 
should be the responsibility of everyone. My point is that pregnancy is not 
‘a woman’s disease.’ And the ‘costs’ should be spread on everyone.”233  
Letty Cottin Pogrebin, the editor of Ms. Magazine, questioned the 
business lobby’s contention that pregnancy could be considered 
“voluntary.” Despite women’s access to birth control and abortion, 
Pogrebin queried: “Can pregnancy be truly voluntary for women if there is 
no other gender around to get pregnant in our place?”234 Barbara Shack of 
 
 
 230. Operaismo was a New Left movement in Italy during the 1960s that advocated for worker 
control of factories. Valdo Spini, The New Left in Italy, 7 J. OF CONTEMP. HIST. 51, 56–58 (1972). 
 231. Patrick Cuninghame, Italian Feminism, Workerism and Autonomy in the 1970s: The Struggle 
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the New York Civil Liberties Union challenged the idea she believed to 
underpin sex discrimination in the insurance industry: “that when a 
woman becomes pregnant, she makes a choice for which . . . she alone 
should suffer the disabilities.”235 Shack argued that “because women serve 
the biological function of continuing the species, society should share the 
disabilities and costs instead of penalizing her for her necessary 
physiological role.”236 
In advocating the PDA, feminists modernized and transformed a 
longstanding discourse in American political culture constructing 
motherhood as a service to society. They did so to affirm women’s right to 
reconcile childbearing with labor-force attachment and that childbearing 
women should access the benefits attached to the employment 
relationship. Feminists thus deployed neomaternal arguments that 
resonated with a familiar form of discourse in the American political 
tradition to advance new ideals. Feminist neomaternal argumentation for 
the PDA sought to end women’s dependence within the private family and 
to promote the economic autonomy of childbearing women. 
C. “The Price Tag of a Baby”: Congress Constructs a Pro-Family Bill 
Neomaternal argumentation for the PDA contributed to its popularity 
in Congress on both sides of the aisle. Politicians, however, emphasized 
the protective and pronatalist dimensions of neomaternalism rather than its 
connection to sex equality. Congressmembers expressed support for the 
PDA because it would encourage childbearing. Congressional supporters 
depicted the PDA as a way to encourage families’ economic security by 
buttressing women’s job security. Rather than emphasizing the importance 
of women’s economic independence from men to sex equality, proponents 
focused on the economic insecurity that families faced when the male-
breadwinner ideal crumbled. In Congressional debates, neomaternalism 
drifted away from feminists’ focus on the just distribution of the costs of 
reproduction toward pronatalist and anti-welfarist rationales for pregnancy 
discrimination legislation.  
In Congress, the political argument for pregnancy disability benefits 
shifted from women’s right to socio-economic independence outside the 
family unit to the need to protect familial economic security. Harrison 
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Williams, the Democrat from New Jersey who was the Chair of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the key sponsor of the PDA 
in the Senate, stated that “far more important” than the “serious setback to 
women’s rights” was the “serious threat” Gilbert posed “to the security of 
the family unit.”237 The pro-family rhetoric of politicians who supported 
the PDA comported with the feminist demand for equal employment 
opportunity but also changed the social and political meaning of the bill. 
Congressional proponents frequently called attention to the changed 
demographic circumstances that made sex-role stereotypes anachronistic. 
A Republican Representative from Connecticut reminded his colleagues 
that 61.4% of American women aged twenty-five to thirty-four years old 
were employed, working “to help provide for the necessities of life.”238 A 
Democratic Senator testified that forty-two percent of female employees 
were single, widowed, divorced, or separated and worked as the sole 
providers for themselves and their families.
239
 Congressmembers 
suggested that pregnancy discrimination peculiarly harmed these single 
mothers and their children.
240
 Politicians highlighted demographic and 
economic change to show that a new social policy had to replace the 
family-wage ideal. 
Members of Congress, as well as feminist and labor advocates, used 
the experience of Sherrie O’Steen, who had served as one of the named 
plaintiffs in Gilbert, to exemplify the material harms rendered by the 
exclusion of pregnancy from benefit coverage. General Electric forced 
O’Steen, who had worked at a Virginia parts facility, to resign from her 
job at the end of her seventh month of pregnancy. O’Steen’s paycheck had 
served as her only source of income. Her husband had abandoned her 
shortly after she found out that she was pregnant. Without work, O’Steen 
could no longer pay her electric bills. She spent part of a winter, until she 
received a state welfare check, caring for herself, her two-year-old 
daughter, and ultimately her newborn baby, in a house that lacked heating, 
lighting, an operable stove, and a working refrigerator.
241
 
The PDA’s Congressional proponents argued that antidiscrimination 
protections for pregnant women would diminish poverty and welfare 
dependence. Congressmembers wanted to prevent situations in which 
 
 
 237. PDA LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 178, at 1 (Statement of Sen. Williams). 
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 240. Id. at 14 (Testimony of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
 241. See id. at 14–15 (Statement of Sen. Birch Bayh), 135 (Statement of Wendy W. Williams, 
Asst. Professor, Georgetown Law Ctr.), 224 (Statement of David J. Fitzmaurice, President, Int’l Union 
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pregnant women’s loss of income would “dissipat[e] family savings” or 
“force[] [women] to go on welfare.”242 Congressional proponents did not 
emphasize the importance of equal employment opportunity to women’s 
achievement of socio-economic independence. Instead, Congress wanted 
to avoid skyrocketing welfare rolls by shoring up familial security when 
reality fell short of the male-breadwinner ideal.  
The construction of the PDA as legislation that would protect 
motherhood split the loyalties of Republicans between market and social 
conservatism. Some Republicans opposed the PDA on the basis of market 
conservatism. Senator Barry Goldwater, whose bid for the presidency in 
1964 exploited anti-Communist, McCarthyist, and libertarian political 
philosophies, exemplified the pro-business argument.
243
 Goldwater stated 
in Congressional debate: “I fully realize that my opposition could be 
interpreted as a vote against motherhood—it is not—it is a vote against 
further, unwarranted Federal interference in what should be a negotiable 
item between labor and management.”244  
Goldwater’s portrayal of the PDA as the latest example of unwarranted 
federal regulation of the market might have represented the views of a 
larger number of Republican Senators but for the rise of neomaternalist 
politics. Senator Orrin Hatch’s stance on the PDA is illustrative. Hatch 
expressed concern about the costs of pregnancy disability benefits that 
employers would “pass[] on to the consumers. . . . [But] [o]n the other 
hand,” Hatch admitted, his “basic sympathy” lay with proponents of the 
PDA.
245
 Hatch found it troubling that temporary disability insurance plans 
covered “hair transplants and vasectomies,” yet not pregnancy.246  
For Hatch, the specter of abortion made shifting the costs of pregnancy 
from individual women to employers more important. In response to 
Andre Hellegers’ testimony, Hatch asked whether the PDA would likely 
reduce or increase abortions. Hellegers responded by reassuring Hatch that 
even if the legislation covered the medical costs associated with both 
childbirth and abortion, it would nonetheless offer far greater financial 
benefit for women carrying pregnancies to term than it would for abortion. 
“The numbers go somewhat like this,” Hellegers calculated: deliveries cost 
ten times more than abortions; three deliveries occurred for every one 
 
 
 242. PDA LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 178, at 3 (Statement of Sen. Harrison Williams). 
 243. For a discussion of Goldwater’s place within the conservative movement of the 1950s and 
1960s, see LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT 111–
95 (2001). 
 244. PDA LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 178, at 183 (Statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater).  
 245. S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 72 (Testimony of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
 246. PDA LEGIS. HISTORY, supra note 178, at 109 (Testimony of Sen. Orrin Hatch).  
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abortion; and a full-term pregnancy lasted about three times the average 
aborted pregnancy. In sum, the legislation would offer about one-hundred 
times the benefits to women who chose to bring their pregnancies to term 
than to those who chose to abort their fetuses.
247
  
While feminists and labor activists viewed the PDA as critical to sex 
equality and anti-abortion activists saw the bill as a source of indirect 
protection for fetal life, civil rights groups viewed the PDA as significant 
to the fight for racial equality. Civil rights groups were particularly 
concerned about retaining the vitality of disparate-impact liability under 
Title VII.
248
 The PDA would represent Congress’s repudiation of the threat 
that Gilbert posed to disparate-impact claims on race or gender.
249
 In 
addition, the PDA would benefit women of color, who participated in the 
labor market at higher rates than did white women.  
Although the PDA would offer protections to working women of all 
races, the statute would nonetheless have disparate benefits along racial 
lines. The prohibition on discriminatory hiring, firing, or promotions on 
the basis of pregnancy would protect all women employees in workplaces 
regulated by Title VII. Whether the PDA would result in health, sick 
leave, and disability benefits for pregnant employees in a given workplace, 
however, would depend on whether that workplace offered these benefits 
generally. Because women of color were more likely to work in smaller 
firms and low-income jobs than were white women, they also were less 
likely to win enhanced fringe benefits under the PDA’s antidiscrimination 
mandate.  
A comparison of neomaternal advocacy for the PDA with maternalist 
activism for greater welfare rights offers insight into the racial 
construction of the PDA in Congress. In the late sixties, the racial politics 
of welfare frustrated efforts to expand welfare entitlements. Legal 
challenges eroded race-based restrictions on public assistance programs 
and increased the number of welfare recipients. As a consequence, 
political backlash against these programs increased.
250
 Anxieties about 
 
 
 247. S. 995 Hearings, supra note 80, at 68–69 (Testimony of Dr. Hellegers). 
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rising welfare rolls, urban unrest, and the purportedly matriarchal black 
family contributed to demand for welfare reform. Racial politics, however, 
also limited the scope of reform efforts.
251
 Southern politicians’ fears that 
a guaranteed income would place upward pressures on the wages of a 
largely minority, low-income workforce contributed to the defeat of 
President Nixon’s proposed Family Assistance Plan (“FAP”).252 Poor 
women used the moral authority of motherhood to campaign for 
augmented welfare entitlements, in lieu of FAP, that would secure a better 
quality of life for their children. Maternalist welfare rights activism by 
poor women of color, however, met with political hostility.
253
 
Neomaternal advocacy for the PDA encountered more fertile, political 
soil than did activism to improve the welfare of poor mothers and their 
children. At least two salient distinctions between neomaternal advocacy 
for the PDA and maternalist advocacy for welfare rights explain the 
differing fate of these reform efforts. First, the racial construction of 
antidiscrimination protections for pregnant women differed from that of 
welfare rights. During the late 1960s and 1970s, AFDC took form in 
national political discourse as an entitlement largely benefiting women of 
color. By contrast, congressional proponents may have viewed the PDA as 
supportive of white motherhood. Economic, social, and legal changes in 
the decades prior to the passage of the PDA had challenged the political 
construction of middle-class motherhood. These factors included: the 
legalization of birth control and abortion; increasing proportions of women 
working during pregnancy and following childbirth; and rising rates of 
single motherhood. Declining fertility rates heightened popular anxieties 
about the economic trends that purportedly discouraged white women 
from reproducing.
254
 The PDA’s promise to encourage implicitly white 
working women to bear children augmented its political appeal. Second, 
the PDA promoted women’s ability to reconcile childbearing with 
 
 
 251. Id. at 117–34.  
 252. The FAP would have provided monetary benefits to all poor and working poor families, 
allocated on the basis of family size and and earnings. See id. at 118, 123–28; see also JENNIFER 
MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL 
REFORM, 1945–1965 (2005) (arguing that a demographic shift during the post-war period among ADC 
recipients from white widows to deserted, divorced, never-married women and women of color 
fostered a rehabilitative focus among social welfare reformers). 
 253. For a discussion, see FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS 
AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 184–87 (2007). 
 254. On the decline in fertility rates among non-Hispanic white women during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, see HERBERT S. KLEIN, A POPULATION HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 192–93 (2d ed. 
2012). For a study of how declining fertility rates, race, and nativism have shaped pronatalist politics 
in another national context, see Jessica Autumn Brown and Myra Marx Ferree, Close Your Eyes and 
Think of England: Pronatalism in the British Print Media, 19 GENDER & SOCIETY 5, 5–24 (2005). 
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continued labor-force participation. By contrast, welfare rights activism 
demanded state remuneration for the labor of caregiving within the home. 
Political discourse constructed AFDC recipients as women who shirked 
participation in the labor force. Advocacy for the PDA, however, affirmed 
market libertarian ideology that depicted remunerated work as superior to 
public assistance. Accordingly, the racial politics of neomaternal advocacy 
for the PDA operated in conjunction with market libertarian ideology to 
contribute to the bill’s passage. 
The construction of the PDA as a pro-family, “pro-life” bill resulted in 
its passage by overwhelming majorities. The Senate passed a version of 
the bill in September 1977 by a vote of seventy-five to eleven, with 
fourteen abstaining; the House passed a version of the bill in July of 1978 
by a vote of three hundred and seventy-six to forty-three, with thirteen 
abstaining.
255
  
Market libertarian arguments had diminished in significance in 
Congress. In arguing before the Court, the business lobby was able to 
successfully wield discourses of reproductive choice to oppose pregnancy 
disability benefits. In a political forum, the business lobby could not 
feasibly argue that pregnant workers did not merit equal benefit coverage 
under temporary disability insurance because they were able to abort their 
fetuses. That argument may have possessed formal logic, but it had no 
political legs. Indeed, anti-abortion activists leveraged the abortion 
controversy to gain support for the PDA as a revitalized form of state 
support for motherhood.  
Neomaternal arguments were more successful in persuading Congress 
than the Supreme Court. PDA supporters believed the bill would give 
women the financial security necessary to protect their choice to bear 
children. Of particular importance to politicians, the PDA would give 
women the economic autonomy required to avoid dependence on the state 
as the family-wage ideal crumbled. Instead of focusing on formalist 
arguments linking pregnancy to temporary disability, the character of 
congressional debate gave feminist advocates the opportunity to better 
explain the social and economic consequences of pregnancy 
discrimination. They argued that pregnancy discrimination both reinforced 
sex-role stereotypes and perpetuated women’s economic inequality.  
In sum, feminists and anti-abortion activists both used neomaternal 
discourses to argue for antidiscrimination protections for pregnant 
workers. Neomaternalism leveraged the social value of motherhood to 
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overcome market libertarian opposition to pregnancy-related entitlements. 
Both feminist and anti-abortion activists for the PDA supported equal 
employment opportunity for women. Whereas feminists emphasized 
childbearing as a productive form of labor that deserved public support, 
anti-abortion activists emphasized the protection of pregnant workers as a 
means to encourage childbearing and protect fetuses.  
D. “I’d Draw a Picture of . . . the Robber Barons Chuckling”: The Beard 
Amendment Threatens the PDA Coalition 
Abortion politics both broadened political support for the PDA and also 
threatened the coalition in favor of the bill. A controversy emerged 
regarding whether the proposed law should require employers to cover 
abortion on an equal basis with other medical and health insurance 
benefits. The controversy caused the ten-month delay between the Senate 
and House votes on the bill. After nearly a year of intense debate, the 
controversy resulted in the passage of an anti-abortion rider to the PDA.  
The rider was not the inevitable consequence of the presence of anti-
abortion activists in the PDA coalition. Many on both sides of the abortion 
debate considered the PDA “pro-life” in the absence of any anti-abortion 
rider. Rhetoric which generated support for the PDA by appealing to the 
social value of motherhood may, however, have lent political legitimacy to 
voices calling for the rider. 
The abortion controversy began in June 1977, when Senator Thomas 
Eagleton (D-MO) proposed an anti-abortion amendment to the PDA in the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The Eagleton 
amendment excluded “nontherapeutic abortions” (those abortions not 
necessary to the health or to save the life of the mother) from the definition 
of “pregnancy” and “related medical conditions” under the PDA.256  
Eagleton, who had served briefly as Senator George McGovern’s 
running mate in the 1972 presidential race, had robust anti-abortion 
credentials.
257
 In 1976, Eagleton had lent his support to the Hyde 
Amendment to the Labor-HEW appropriations. The Hyde Amendment 
prohibited the use of federal Medicaid funds “to perform abortions except 
 
 
 256. Id. at 54.  
 257. As one of the Senators instrumental in passing the Family Planning Services Act of 1970—
the federal government’s first piece of legislation allocating federal funds for family-planning 
services—Eagleton had secured a ban on the use of the funds for abortion. In 1973, Eagleton 
supported an amendment to the Public Health Services Act prohibiting any requirement that health-
care institutions agree to perform abortion or sterilization procedures as a precondition to receiving 
federal funds. Id. at 113.  
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where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried 
to term.”258 The Amendment represented the first success of anti-abortion 
activists who in the late 1970s fought to restrict abortion’s availability and 
not to overrule Roe.
259
 Prior to the Hyde Amendment, abortion rates for 
women receiving Medicaid were three times those for higher-income 
women. Accordingly, critics opposed the Amendment on the ground that it 
limited poor women’s capacity to exercise their rights to abortion.260  
Unlike the Hyde Amendment, the PDA did not involve the use of 
federal funds. Nevertheless, Eagleton argued that “Federal laws should not 
be utilized to force an individual to violate his or her moral conscience.”261 
Eagleton’s anti-abortion rider responded to a concern expressed by the 
National Conference of Bishops that the PDA would require employers to 
pay for employees’ abortions.262 Opponents of the Eagleton Amendment, 
however, protested that neither the business lobby nor other anti-abortion 
organizations had testified on behalf of the need for an anti-abortion rider. 
The consensus had been that the legislation, unamended, was “prolife.”263  
Feminist advocates feared that the Eagleton rider would license a broad 
range of discriminatory practices as well as exempt employers from 
paying for abortion. If the definition of pregnancy and related medical 
conditions excluded abortion, then employers could refuse to hire, fail to 
promote, or fire women on the basis of past abortions or their plan to seek 
a future abortion. Feminist advocates rushed to perform triage. They 
needed to at least constrain the expansive anti-abortion rider to protect 
women from extensive employment discrimination.
264
 Eagleton’s 
colleagues on the Senate Committee on Human Resources defeated the 
amendment in a June 1977 vote.
265
 When the PDA came before the full 
Senate in September of 1977, Eagleton again made an unsuccessful 
attempt to attach the same anti-abortion rider to the bill.
266
  
In early 1978, Representative Edward Beard (D-RI) proposed an anti-
abortion amendment to the House’s pregnancy discrimination legislation. 
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The Beard Amendment to the PDA exempted employers from mandatory 
coverage of abortion except when necessary to save the life of the mother 
but required employers to cover medical complications resulting from 
abortions.
267
 In March 1978, the House Committee on Education and 
Labor reported its version of the PDA containing the Beard Amendment to 
the entire House.
268
 Anti-abortion advocates who had supported the PDA 
took differing positions on the Beard Amendment. The U.S. Catholic 
Conference had drafted the language of the Amendment and backed it 
heavily.
269
 ACCL, however, called the PDA “on balance, a pro-life bill” 
and supported the legislation with or without the Amendment.
270
 
Representative William L. Clay (D-Mo) opposed abortion but resented the 
way in which the issue functioned as “an albatross on all legislation.”271  
Legal and labor feminist activists considered whether to fight the Beard 
Amendment at the risk of losing the entire campaign for the legislation. 
Feminists opposed the Beard Amendment, but they also recognized it as 
less pernicious than the alternative anti-abortion rider initially proposed by 
Eagleton.
272
 The Eagleton rider excluded non-therapeutic abortions from 
the definition of medical conditions related to pregnancy. That exclusion 
threatened to make past or potential future abortions a valid basis for 
discrimination in hiring, promotion, or other employment decisions. By 
contrast, the Beard Amendment did not exclude abortion from the 
definition of conditions related to pregnancy. Instead, the Beard 
Amendment exempted employers from the responsibility of covering 
abortions within health, disability, or sickness insurance plans (except for 
abortions necessary to save the life of the mother). In significant respects, 
the Beard Amendment narrowed the scope of the anti-abortion rider 
proposed by Eagleton. The Beard Amendment would result in 
discrimination in benefits but not in employment decisions.  
Feminist pragmatism won out over idealist politics. Ruth Weyand 
wrote to Olga Madar suggesting that the Chamber of Commerce, National 
Association of Manufacturers, and the insurance industry had stopped 
lobbying against pregnancy discrimination legislation because they 
“count[ed] on the women fighting among themselves over abortion to kill 
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the bill.”273 Weyand elaborated: “If I were a cartoonist I’d draw a picture 
of what we used to call the Robber Barons chuckling over . . . what a close 
call they had just escaped.”274 She referenced the $225 billion that she 
alleged employers saved each year by paying women discriminatory, 
unequal wages, on the justification that women left the workforce to have 
children.  
Weyand described the business lobby’s strategy to defeat a bill that 
would prohibit such discrimination, as she imagined it, as follows: “. . . the 
wife of Robber Baron Jay will make a large gift of money to the pro 
abortion forces. The wife of Robber Baron Tom will make an even larger 
gift of money to the antiabortion forces. The House members will be 
convinced this is a no-win bill.”275 Weyand believed that the abortion rider 
might not have significant, practical consequences for women workers 
because General Motors, the airlines, and General Electric all paid for 
abortions in their contracts.
276
 Abortions were cheaper than hospital 
childbirths and also maintained workforce productivity by enabling 
women to return to work sooner.  
Despite feminist pragmatism regarding the Beard Amendment, the 
escalation of anti-abortion politics threatened to fracture the coalition that 
had mobilized in support of the PDA. By mid-summer 1978, the House 
had passed legislation containing the Beard Amendment, while the Senate 
had passed the same bill, without the rider. Some legislators who had 
supported the bill reluctantly stated that they would withdraw their support 
because the amendment represented “another governmental statement and 
intrusion into the private lives of women.”277 Although the abortion 
controversy delayed the bill by several months, the PDA coalition did not 
dissolve.  
In mid-October the designated conferees from both bodies settled on a 
conference report.
278
 The conference agreement provided that the 
provision would not require an employer to cover abortion in health 
insurance benefits, except in the case when a woman’s life would be 
endangered were she to carry the fetus to term or in the case of medical 
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complications arising from an abortion.
279
 The conference report also 
included an agreement on the bill’s effective date.280 
E. A Statutory Compromise: The Imprint of Neomaternalism and Market 
Libertarianism on the Design of the PDA 
The structure of the PDA bears the imprint of both market libertarian 
and neomaternal advocacy. The first clause of the PDA defined 
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII to include discrimination 
on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.”281 
The second clause of the PDA responded directly to the fact pattern at 
issue in Gilbert by mandating the “same treatment” of pregnant workers 
and others “similar in their ability or inability to work.”282 By requiring 
equal treatment of pregnancy and childbirth under sick leave, health 
insurance, disability benefits, and other fringe benefits, the PDA shifts the 
costs of pregnancy and childbirth from individual women to the employer 
and, by implication, spreads these costs across the workforce. 
Although the PDA further spread the costs of pregnancy and childbirth 
across society, however, it also preserved market libertarian commitments 
to keeping these costs private. The PDA did not socialize the costs of 
reproduction.  
From the statute’s inception, there existed ambiguity regarding the 
extent to which the PDA would reallocate the costs of pregnancy and 
childbirth. The PDA amended Title VII, which the Supreme Court 
interpreted in 1971 to recognize disparate impact as well as disparate 
treatment liability.
283
 Isolated statements by members of Congress during 
the legislative debates about the PDA, however, suggested that the PDA 
would not impose more than a mandate of same treatment for pregnancy 
under existing fringe benefits. Congressmembers who supported the PDA 
spoke of the statute in narrow terms to reassure opponents that it would 
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(2006)). 
 282. Id. 
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not vastly increase costs for employers.
284
 Thus, from the beginning, 
interpreters of the PDA disputed the degree to which its antidiscrimination 
mandate would reallocate the costs of reproduction. 
While the PDA’s concession to a patchwork of private employer-
sponsored health and disability insurance compromised feminists’ 
neomaternal commitments, the PDA also included a significant concession 
that compromised feminist’s anti-stereotyping commitments. The Beard 
Amendment to the PDA created an asymmetry in the design of the PDA 
that reinforced childbearing as a normative role for women. In promoting 
the labor-force attachment of pregnant women and their access to 
insurance benefits, the PDA affirmed that childbearing women had a right 
to maintain economic autonomy. The PDA thus challenged a legal system 
that made childbearing women dependents within the private family. The 
Beard Amendment, however, reinforced the legal construction of abortion 
as a negative right that did not merit public support. The PDA embodied 
the valence of neomaternalism that reinforced the normative primacy of 
childbearing. 
The PDA thus represented a statutory compromise for all sides. The 
business lobby lost its battle against the prohibition on pregnancy 
discrimination. Yet it succeeded in foreclosing alternative, more expansive 
social insurance schemes and in shaping the legislative history of the PDA 
in a manner that rendered ambiguous the scope of employers’ duty of 
accommodation under disparate-impact liability. While anti-abortion 
activists did not succeed in reversing Roe, neomaternal advocacy for the 
PDA did achieve greater public support for childbearing. Feminists won in 
the PDA both a prohibition on sex-role stereotyping related to pregnancy 
and a legal mechanism that further spread the costs of pregnancy across 
the workforce. They lost, however, their most robust vision to achieve 
collective responsibility for the costs of reproduction and to realize 
economic supports for women to exercise reproductive choice. The 
meaning of the PDA, however, did not crystallize upon the bill’s 
enactment, but rather took shape as judicial doctrine under the statute and 
broader gender politics evolved. 
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IV. THE LEGACIES OF LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM AND NEOMATERNALISM 
IN INTERPRETIVE CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE PDA 
The PDA did not resolve contests between liberal individualist and 
neomaternal constructions of sex equality. Both these legal paradigms 
have shaped doctrinal debates from the 1980s to the present. In the 1980s, 
as Part IV.A chronicles, deepening economic and social conservatism 
frustrated feminists’ ability to fuse a commitment to anti-stereotyping with 
a commitment to equal employment opportunity for working-class 
women. The tensions between equal treatment and economic rights, which 
had divided women’s rights activists in the early twentieth century, again 
catalyzed splits among feminist legal activists that have persisted to the 
present. In recent decades, as Part IV.B discusses, courts have for the most 
part interpreted the PDA through the lens of liberal individualism’s dual 
valences. Courts interpret the PDA as a prohibition on market irrational 
sex-role stereotypes, but resist interpretations of the PDA that would shift 
the costs of some workers’ partial incapacity during pregnancy onto 
employers. In contrast to courts’ market libertarian rulings, plaintiffs and 
antidiscrimination scholars offer alternative interpretations of the PDA 
rooted in neomaternal conceptions of the bill’s purpose.  
The history related in Parts I through III of this Article does not hand 
us a readily usable past. History cannot resolve contemporary debates in 
judicial doctrine or feminist legal theory, but it can offer insight into their 
intellectual and political genealogies. By uncovering the competing 
conceptions of sex equality that animate liberal individualist and 
neomaternal interpretations of the PDA, the history of the 1970s 
illuminates the normative stakes of ongoing doctrinal controversies.   
A. The 1980s Split in Legal Feminism 
Soon after the enactment of the PDA, labor organizations and feminist 
activists confronted the limitations of the statute. The PDA itself failed to 
provide a direct entitlement to job-protected pregnancy leave, income 
replacement, or health insurance coverage. As a result, the economic 
security of pregnant women varied according to the extent of the fringe 
benefit plans offered at their workplaces. The gaps in the statute’s ability 
to promote the labor-force attachment and economic security of pregnant 
workers had disproportionate effects on working-class women. Lower-
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income workers were far more likely to be employed in workplaces that 
lacked adequate health- and disability-related benefits.
285
  
In the 1980s, intensifying economic and social conservatism shaped the 
way in which feminist activists addressed the limitations of the PDA. The 
doctrinal controversies of the 1980s replicated the theoretical tensions 
between liberal individualism and neomaternalism which feminists had 
experienced in advocating the PDA. Market libertarianism foreclosed the 
possibility of expanding sex neutral, universal temporary disability 
insurance, while neomaternalism made it possible to expand sex-specific 
entitlements targeted to pregnant workers.  
Market libertarianism in the political culture had undermined feminist 
efforts to achieve universal entitlements for all temporarily disabled 
workers via social insurance systems. Since the late 1960s, feminist 
reformers had taken account of the limits of an equal-treatment mandate. 
While advocating equal treatment for pregnancy under existing benefit 
schemes, reformers had also proposed the expansion of state temporary 
disability insurance programs or the establishment of a similar insurance 
program at the federal level.
286
 Neither had proven politically feasible. 
Neomaternal sentiment, however, provided a political opportunity to gain 
benefits specific to pregnant workers. Feminists could leverage broader 
societal sentiment in favor of protecting motherhood to gain entitlements 
related to biological reproduction and caregiving. Feminists’ use of 
neomaternal argumentation to demand a more just distribution of 
responsibility for reproduction also coincided uncomfortably with calls for 
revitalized state protection of motherhood as a normative role for women.   
In doctrinal controversies regarding the interpretation of the PDA 
during the 1980s, feminists thus faced a painful decision. They could 
sacrifice some of their commitment to affirmative entitlements that would 
enhance the economic security of working-class women to avoid 
reinforcing sex-role stereotypes. Or they could obtain protections that 
promoted the labor-force attachment of working-class women, while 
sacrificing some of the movement’s most robust anti-stereotyping goals. In 
the 1970s, the campaign for the PDA had contained the tension between 
anti-stereotyping and neomaternal commitments. Equal coverage for 
 
 
 285. See Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2007). 
 286. See Koontz, supra note 44, at 502 (“A long range goal is the achievement of protection 
against loss of income for temporary disabilities for the forty per cent of working men and women who 
now have no protection.”). In 1968, the Citizens’ Advisory Council Task Force on Social Insurance 
and Taxes “recommended establishment of a federal temporary disability insurance system as a part of 
a [pre-existing] federal-state unemployment insurance program.” Id. at 497–98. 
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pregnancy under public and private insurance plans implicated both a 
challenge to sex-role stereotypes and also a demand for affirmative 
entitlements that would enable women to reconcile workforce participation 
with childbearing. In the 1980s, however, a new political and legal 
context—the gaps in coverage left by the PDA as well as growing 
economic and social conservatism—meant that these dual ideals divided 
feminists between competing goals.  
The heated controversy among feminist attorneys arose in response to 
pregnancy-leave statutes, which several states passed after the Supreme 
Court’s 1976 Gilbert decision. Neomaternal political sentiment in favor of 
protecting women in their childbearing capacity had provided the impetus 
for the statutes. In Montana, for example, the joint subcommittee 
responsible for drafting the state’s Maternity Leave Act endeavored to 
harmonize an equal rights amendment to the state constitution with the 
“essential protections” provided by state government.287  
Political sentiment in favor of protecting motherhood helped overcome 
business opposition to the passage of a pregnancy-leave statute in 
California. The California Manufacturers Association and several other 
business trade associations
288 
mobilized market libertarian arguments to 
challenge two provisions in the state bill that would have shifted the costs 
of pregnancy to employers.
289
 These provisions would have required equal 
treatment for pregnancy under health insurance and disability benefits and 
would have required employers to give pregnant women light duty 
accommodations. The business lobby succeeded in defeating these 
provisions. By failing to require equal treatment of pregnancy under 
benefit plans, the final California pregnancy-leave bill fell below the 
antidiscrimination standards required by the PDA then under debate in 
Congress. Significantly, the part of the California law that survived 
business opposition—job-protected pregnancy leave—was the provision 
of the bill most clearly targeted at helping women reconcile labor-market 
 
 
 287. MONT. LEGIS. COUNCIL, EQUALITY OF THE SEXES: INTERIM STUDY BY THE SUBCOMM. ON 
JUDICIARY 1 (1974). 
 288. The most powerful opponents of the California pregnancy leave bill included the California 
Manufacturers’ Association, California State Restaurant Association, Western Electronics 
Manufacturers, Pacific Telephone Company, and the Construction Industry Legislative Council. 
Employment Discrimination Based on Pregnancy: Hearing on A.B. 1960 Before the Assembly Comm. 
on Labor, Emp’t, & Consumer Affairs (Cal. 1978) (on file with author).  
 289. Id.; Memorandum from Lee Adler, Exec. Vice President, California Seed Ass’n, for 
Members of the Senate Indus. Relations Comm. (Apr. 4, 1978) (on file with author) (arguing that “[i]t 
is the employee’s choice to become pregnant and the employer should not be held financially 
responsible in any way”). 
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participation with childbearing.
290
 A desire to protect women in their 
childbearing roles, rather than to secure equal employment opportunity for 
women, proved the most persuasive rationale to legislators. Neomaternal 
political sentiment convinced the California legislature to pass the bill 
over the business lobby’s opposition.  
In the early 1980s, employers in Montana and California challenged 
the states’ pregnancy-leave laws as preempted by the PDA. The hotly 
contested lawsuits divided feminist legal activists into two sparring camps. 
Some feminists believed that the state laws violated the PDA’s equal-
treatment mandate and represented a potentially pernicious new form of 
protective legislation. Wendy Williams, the lawyer who had represented 
the plaintiffs in Geduldig, was the strongest voice against the pregnancy-
leave laws. Williams feared that the laws might discourage the hiring of 
women by making female employees relatively more expensive to 
employ.
291
 In addition, Williams argued that laws mandating pregnancy 
leave specifically, rather than leave for all workers suffering incapacity 
related to a temporary disability, risked reinforcing childbearing as a 
unique and primary social role for women.
292
 Williams’s position 
prioritized the PDA’s prohibition on the use of sex-role stereotypes to 
regulate pregnant workers.  
Other feminists, however, believed that the state pregnancy-leave laws 
would advance sex equality. Linda Krieger and Patricia Cooney, then civil 
rights lawyers in San Francisco, critiqued the notion that same treatment 
would realize sex equality. Because women faced unique obstacles not 
faced by men, same treatment could not guarantee equal employment 
opportunity. Conversely, legislation that took affirmative steps “to 
equalize this inherent sex difference” would not in turn justify unfavorable 
treatment of pregnant women.
293
 Reva Siegel, then a law student, 
expanded on this argument. She argued that because the PDA amended 
Title VII, the PDA recognized disparate-impact as well as disparate-
treatment liability. Accordingly, the state pregnancy-leave laws remedied 
 
 
 290. The initial bill in California, A.B. 1960, prohibited an employer from refusing to grant 
pregnant employees “reasonable” leave time, and from treating pregnancy differently than temporary 
disabilities. Hearing on A.B. 1960, supra note 288. 
 291. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 371 (1984–85). 
 292. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and 
Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982).  
 293. Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, 
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513, 517 (1983).  
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the disparate impact that the dearth of disability leave in California’s 
workplaces had on women.
294
 
When the case of California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. 
Guerra
295
 ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, feminist and civil 
rights organizations wrote opposing briefs that encapsulated the strategic 
and ideological divisions among feminists. National advocacy 
organizations embraced a robust anti-stereotyping interpretation of the 
PDA. The American Civil Liberties Union argued that the California law 
“reflect[ed] an ideology which values women most highly for their 
childbearing and nurturing roles . . . [and] reinforce[s] stereotypes about 
women’s inclinations and abilities.”296 Likewise, the AFL-CIO and 
National Organization for Women (“NOW”) argued employers would 
violate the PDA if they gave leave only to pregnant women and not to 
other temporarily disabled individuals. These latter two organizations, 
however, argued that the Court could reconcile the federal and state 
statutes. The Court might require employers to comply with both statutes 
by extending the leave available to pregnant workers to all temporarily 
disabled workers.
297
 
By contrast, several other feminist organizations split from the ACLU, 
AFL-CIO, and NOW and formed the Coalition for Reproductive Equality 
in the Workplace (“CREW”) to defend the California pregnancy-leave 
law. Activists with labor backgrounds proved willing to give up some of 
the PDA’s anti-stereotyping potential to promote equal employment 
opportunity for women. CREW argued for a shift in the baseline frame of 
reference: the California pregnancy-leave law did not extend special 
treatment to women but rather corrected the “burden . . . wholly visited 
upon women” when inadequate leave policies resulted in pregnant women 
losing their jobs.
298
 CREW’s position was that the California law did not 
uniquely advantage women but rather leveled a playing field that 
heretofore disadvantaged women.  
 
 
 294. Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 929–30 (1985).  
 295. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).  
 296. Brief of the ACLU et al., Amici Curiae at 7, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 
272 (1987) (No. 85-494). 
 297. See Brief of the Am. Fed. of Labor & Cong. of Indust. Orgs. as Amicus Curiae, Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494); Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Org. 
for Women et al. in Support of Neither Party, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 
(1987) (No. 85-494). 
 298. Brief Amici Curiae of Coal. for Reprod. Equal. in the Workplace et al. at 17–18, Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494).  
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The paradigm shift advanced by CREW, however, depended on a 
departure from the strictest construction of the temporary disability 
analogy. If one viewed pregnancy as distinct from temporary disability, 
one would then view women as disadvantaged relative to men by the lack 
of adequate leave policies. The California law then became a corrective 
measure rather than a unique benefit. But if one viewed pregnancy 
disability as indistinguishable from other temporary disabilities for the 
purposes of employment law and policy, as Wendy Williams did, then 
pregnancy leave appeared to function as differential treatment that reified 
childbearing as uniquely meritorious of public support.  
The Supreme Court took the side of CREW. In a majority opinion 
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the California 
pregnancy-leave law advanced the PDA’s purpose of equal employment 
opportunity and, accordingly, that the PDA did not preempt the state 
law.
299
 The Court’s decision in California Federal interpreted the PDA to 
establish “a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not 
drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise.”300 The majority 
opinion interpreted the “same treatment” language in the second clause of 
the PDA in its historical context, not as “a limitation on the remedial 
purpose of the PDA” but as an expression of intent to override Gilbert.301 
California Federal manifested the dual valences of neomaternalism. The 
statute reallocated the costs of childbearing by mandating pregnancy leave 
that promoted the labor-force attachment of working-class women. The 
decision also validated a state law that, in offering a benefit to pregnant 
workers unavailable to other temporarily disabled workers, reinforced 
ideas about the unique value of motherhood. 
The tensions highlighted in the debates about California Federal— 
between commitments to anti-stereotyping and to a just allocation of the 
costs of reproduction—persist today. Some feminists call for greater state 
entitlements related to caretaking as a means to challenge the gender 
inequality that stems from the privatization of dependence.
302
 Other 
feminists caution that state support for childrearing may serve the state’s 
 
 
 299. The Court observed that the California statute applied only to “the period of actual physical 
disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” and did not “reflect 
archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of pregnant workers.” Cal. Federal, 
479 U.S. at 290. 
 300. Cal. Federal, 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 
396 (9th Cir. 1985)).  
 301. Id.  
 302. See FINEMAN, supra note 5; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring 
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
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interest in repronormative policies
303
 and may also reinforce an association 
between women and caretaking in the home.
304
 Accommodations for 
pregnancy and childrearing women in the workplace, some warn, may 
impose disproportionate costs on women who are not mothers.
305
 Still 
other feminists focus their attention not on public responsibility for 
dependence but rather on the socio-legal construction of masculinity and 
the sexual division of caretaking labor.
306
 
B. Liberal Individualism and Neomaternalism in Contemporary Doctrinal 
Controversy 
With few exceptions, courts today interpret the PDA according to a 
liberal individualist rather than a neomaternal framework. Federal courts 
understand the PDA to prohibit market-irrational sex-role stereotypes 
concerning pregnancy. The courts are reluctant, however, to interpret the 
PDA as a legal mandate that shifts the costs of pregnancy from individual 
employees to employers. Some of that reluctance stems from the design of 
the PDA itself as an anti-discrimination mandate rather than a social-
welfare entitlement. Even when the structure and text of Title VII and the 
PDA support plaintiffs’ claims for cost-sharing, however, courts are often 
resistant to such an interpretation. That reluctance is particularly evident in 
judicial doctrine respecting two areas: disparate impact liability under the 
PDA and employers’ duty to extend workplace accommodations to 
pregnant employees on the same basis as they do to other workers.  
Although the existence of disparate-impact liability is not disputed,
307
 
in practice, disparate-impact claims have rarely proven an effective means 
to enact widespread change in workplace policies. In the early 1980s, two 
federal district court decisions allowed plaintiffs’ claims that challenged 
leave policies as rendering an unlawful disproportionate burden on 
 
 
 303. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541 
(2001) (cautioning that the effort to make privatized care a public responsibility poses risks for 
feminists because the state will have its own agenda).   
 304. See Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman’s The 
Autonomy Myth, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1285 (2005) (Review Essay).  
 305. Mary Ann Case, Commentary, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions about 
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 
(2001).  
 306. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS 
MATTER (2010). 
 307. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998); Lang v. Star 
Herald, 107 F.3d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997); Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
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pregnant women to survive summary judgment.
308
 Plaintiffs have since 
brought disparate-impact claims challenging strict absenteeism rules,
309
 
inadequate sick-leave policies,
310
 the absence of family leave,
311
 and 
heavy-lifting requirements.
312
 Courts, however, routinely reject these 
claims under the PDA by characterizing them as a demand for preferential 
treatment or a subsidy inconsistent with an antidiscrimination mandate.
313
 
These rulings evince a market libertarian interpretation that the PDA is 
neutral with respect to workplace structures that force pregnant women out 
of the workplace.  
The contest between market libertarian and neomaternal interpretations 
of the PDA is highlighted by a second doctrinal controversy respecting 
accommodations for injured workers. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently 
considering a petition for certiorari in the case of Young v. United Parcel 
Services, Inc., which raises the issue whether an employer that provides 
work accommodations to nonpregnant employees must do the same for 
pregnant employees.
314
 Like many other employers, UPS offers light-duty 
accommodations for employees with on-the-job injuries but does not 
extend these accommodations to pregnant employees. When pregnant 
plaintiffs bring disparate-treatment claims that challenge restrictive light-
duty policies, the resulting doctrinal controversies center on the 
appropriate class of comparators. Employers argue that the appropriate 
class of comparators for pregnant employees is other employees who 
sustained non-occupational injuries. From this perspective, pregnant 
workers do not merit light-duty assignments because they are not similarly 
situated to the employees with workplace injuries. Most courts have sided 
with employers in cases in which plaintiffs challenge restrictive light-duty 
policies by bringing either disparate-treatment or disparate-impact 
claims.
315
 These interpretations of the PDA privatize the economic 
burdens arising from partial capacity during pregnancy and childbirth. 
 
 
 308. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981); EEOC v. 
Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 651–55 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 309. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 859–60 (5th Cir. 2002); Dormeyer 
v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 581–83 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 310. See, e.g., Lang, 107 F.3d at 1310. 
 311. See, e.g., Maganuco v. Leyden Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 212, 939 F.2d 440, 441–42 (7th Cir. 
1991); Roberts v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 287–88 (E.D. Tex. 1996). 
 312. See, e.g., Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 1999); Garcia v. 
Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 811–12 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 313. See Dinner, supra note 44, at 485–88. 
 314. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3602 (Apr. 8, 2013) (No. 12-1226).  
 315. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 
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By contrast, scholars of pregnancy discrimination law have advanced 
an interpretation of the PDA that argues in favor of light-duty 
accommodations. These scholars point to EEOC guidelines interpreting 
the second clause of the PDA to require that employers make the same 
accommodations for pregnant workers as for other temporarily disabled 
workers.
316
 Leading scholars of the PDA argue that the statute’s equal-
treatment mandate requires the extension of light-duty accommodations to 
pregnant workers when employers make light-duty work available to other 
employees.
317
 Whether employers extend light-duty assignments to all 
workers or only to those with on-the-job injuries should not matter to the 
requirement of same treatment for pregnancy.
318
 These interpretations of 
the PDA continue a neomaternal tradition, arguing in cases of doctrinal 
ambiguity for a resolution that shifts the costs of reproduction from 
employees to employer. The trend in the courts may be turning toward this 
view. In recent years, two district courts held that plaintiffs could make 
disparate-impact claims under the PDA to challenge the restriction of 
light-duty assignments to employees with workplace injuries.
319
 
As in the past, tensions between market libertarian and neomaternal 
ideologies persist in debates about pregnancy discrimination. We can trace 
the origins of contemporary market libertarian interpretations of the PDA 
to the business lobby’s opposition to pregnancy disability benefits in the 
1970s. We also see echoes of earlier neomaternal arguments about the just 
allocation of the costs of reproduction in contemporary interpretations of 
the PDA favoring expansive conceptions of employers’ duty to 
accommodate pregnant workers. The history related in this Article helps 
us to better understand the differing conceptions of gender, sex equality, 
 
 
F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 
1998); Young, 707 F.3d at 446–49. 
 316. Widiss, supra note 41, at 1019 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604 app. Question 5 (2013)).  
 317. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO L.J. 
567, 613–15 (2010) (critiquing jurisprudence limiting the PDA’s comparative right of 
accommodation); see also Dinner, supra note 44, at 482–85 (critiquing court opinions that limit the 
comparison group in light-duty claims under the PDA to nonpregnant workers with non-occupational 
injuries). 
 318. Most recently, Deborah Widiss has extended this argument to take account of 
accommodations extended to employees under the Americans with Disabilites Act (“ADA”). The 
ADA does not classify “normal” pregnancy, absent extraordinary complications, as a disability. 
Nonetheless, Widiss argues, that when employers extend light-duty work to employees covered under 
the ADA, the same-treatment language of the PDA requires that they similarly extend light-duty work 
to pregnant employees. Widiss, supra note 41, at 1025–34. 
 319. See Germain v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523, 2009 WL 1514513, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 
29, 2009); Lochren v. Cnty.of Suffolk, No. 01CV03925, 2006 WL 6850118 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006). 
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reproductive choice, and the labor market that animate these competing 
interpretations. 
CONCLUSION 
In the 1970s, feminist legal advocacy synthesized commitments to 
eliminating sex-role stereotypes under the law and to the just distribution 
of the costs of reproduction. The constraints of the available legal and 
political frames led feminists to articulate this goal through two competing 
discourses: liberal individualist and neomaternalist. The conjunction of 
these two legal paradigms represented a potentially transformative vision 
for sex equality. When feminists coupled liberal individualist arguments 
with neomaternal arguments, they sought both to challenge sex-role 
stereotypes and to demand collective responsibility for the costs of 
reproduction. The coupling of these forms of argument challenged the 
market libertarian strain of liberal individualism and also combatted the 
valence of neomaternalism which reinforced childbearing as the normative 
social role for women. The synthesis of liberal individualism and 
neomaternalism aspired to an ambitious vision of sex equality. This vision 
entailed an end to the family-wage ideal, equal employment opportunity 
for women, and the conditions that would enable women to exercise 
reproductive choice without sacrificing economic autonomy. 
Since the 1970s, however, the synthesis of liberal individualist and 
neomaternal paradigms has fractured, and both these ideologies have 
evolved in ways that have reinforced the privatization of dependency. 
Market libertarianism intensified in two notable ways. The discourse of 
reproductive choice continues to legitimate workplace structures modeled 
on the masculine ideal as well as social policies that provide inadequate 
public supports for families. Employers and the business lobby continue to 
wield libertarian arguments about choice to counteract legal mandates 
requiring coverage for women’s reproductive health under fringe benefit 
plans. Likewise, maternalism evolved away from a commitment to 
empowering women as workers, which characterized neomaternal 
activism during the 1970s, and toward protecting women in their roles as 
mothers. Advocacy in favor of legal entitlements for mothers is 
considerably muted within the contemporary anti-abortion movement. 
Today’s maternalists call for state support for motherhood while 
reinforcing the sexual division of labor within the home.  
Market libertarian choice rhetoric continues to function as a discourse 
that legitimates gender inequality. Scholars have shown how courts use the 
concept of choice to attribute the negative effects of sex discriminatory 
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employment practices to women’s individual behaviors.320 Similarly, 
choice functions as a potent political argument that attributes the 
difference in the labor market outcomes experienced by men and women 
to private decisionmaking.
321
 The concept of reproductive choice functions 
to ratify private rather than public responsibility for childrearing, to the 
particular detriment of poor families.
322
 The construction of choice as a 
private activity obfuscates the ways in which a lack of financial resources 
constrains low-income women’s ability to exercise their reproductive 
rights.
323
 
Secular, for-profit employers today continue to use the idea of choice 
to resist labor regulation. Their arguments focus not on the reproductive 
choices of their employees but on companies’ rights to exercise choice in 
issues of conscience.
324
 Employers couple market-libertarian arguments 
with claims to religious liberty under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Of particular 
relevance to this Article, employers use free-exercise claims to challenge 
the Affordable Care Act’s contraception benefit rule.325 As legal scholar 
Elizabeth Sepper observes, these lawsuits asserting religious liberty on 
behalf of companies conflate the identity of the corporation and its owners 
or shareholders.
326
 Lawsuits resisting the contraception mandate echo the 
legal arguments of employers in the 1970s that were hostile to 
 
 
 320. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of 
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1749, 1800–06 (1990) (analyzing how courts use a narrative of “choice” to legitimate 
employers’ lack of interest defense in sex discrimination cases). 
 321. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at SM44 (arguing 
that many professional women are choosing to leave the workforce for motherhood). See also Judith 
Warner, Ready to Rejoin the Rat Race, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 11, 2013, at MM25 (revisiting 
Belkin’s Article and describing the return to the workforce by the professional women who departed in 
the early 2000s, as well as the social, psychological, and economic costs of their earlier decisions).  
 322. West, supra note 119, at 1409–10 (arguing that Roe v. Wade legitimized a meager social-
welfare net for poor parents). 
 323. Caps on public assistance on the basis of family size, for example, limit poor women’s 
exercise of their reproductive rights to bear children. 
 324. See Courtney Miller, Note, Reflections on Protecting Conscience for Health Care Providers: 
A Call for More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light of Constitutional Considerations, 15 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 327, 340 (2006) (“The abortion choice, the legal right which is rooted in 
an autonomy right, has provoked a call for a legal right to choose not to participate in abortion, 
echoing the same language of choice and autonomy.”). 
 325. Although the Department of Health and Human Services exempted religious employers, such 
as churches, and religiously affiliated non-profits, the contraception mandate has nonetheless 
generated extensive litigation. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 
2012), injunction pending appeal denied, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012), 
and injunction pending appeal denied, 133 S. Ct. 641, remanded and rev’d, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 
2013), and cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678. 
 326. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism (forthcoming).  
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antidiscrimination mandates related to pregnancy. In both eras, employers 
argue that women’s healthcare needs are unique and beyond the scope of 
legitimate labor regulation. In both eras, employers have used market 
libertarian arguments about choice, in reproductive activity and in 
religious conscience, to advance their economic interests.  
While market libertarian politics have intensified, the 1970s 
neomaternal advocacy by anti-abortion activists that called for collective 
social responsibility for the costs of pregnancy and childbirth has largely 
waned. By the early 1980s, New Right and religious right mobilization 
aligned the anti-abortion movement squarely within the Republican Party. 
As economic conservatism and social conservatism consolidated in 
electoral politics, neomaternal advocacy rooted in a principled opposition 
to abortion muted significantly. The mainstream anti-abortion movement 
assumed a more absolutist conservative stance on a host of social issues. It 
became both rarer and more difficult for anti-abortion activists to support 
pregnancy-related entitlements, welfare assistance for poor mothers, and 
sex education. 
Only on the margins of the anti-abortion movement does advocacy in 
favor of public entitlements for pregnant women, mothers, and children 
continue to exist. In 1972, two members of Ohio’s NOW chapter, Pat 
Goltz and Catherine Gallagher, founded Feminists for Life (“FFL”).327 
FFL continues today to work toward its mission of combatting abortions 
through support for childbearing women as well as legal restrictions.
328
 
FFL calls attention to the background conditions of social and economic 
equality that constrain women’s reproductive choices.329 The group 
lobbied against welfare reform that capped public assistance regardless of 
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family size; campaigned for prenatal care in New York’s state health 
insurance plan; and was the only pro-life group to join the coalition to pass 
the Violence Against Women Act.
330
 In 2005, FFL first proposed the 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton Pregnant and Parenting Student Services Act, 
which eventually became part of the Affordable Care Act.
331
  
FFL does not draw upon the labor and socialist traditions that feminist 
advocates used to construct childbearing as a form of socially valuable 
labor. Instead, FFL calls upon the state to protect mothers as well as 
fetuses.
332
 FFL’s support for welfare measures endorses public 
responsibility for the reproductive activity of poor women. The group’s 
advocacy in favor of child support enforcement, by contrast, suggests that 
the private family is the appropriate location for managing dependence.
333
 
FFL points to constraints on women’s reproductive autonomy, but the 
group fails to similarly take account of the repronormative policies that 
also limit women’s independent decisionmaking.334 For FFL, the decision 
to bear a child is the only morally legitimate choice
335
 and the choice that 
women would naturally make absent external pressures.
336
 FFL suggests 
the possibility of ongoing coalition building between feminists and anti-
abortion activists. Ultimately, however, FFL represents not so much the 
potential for a happy alignment of cause between pro-life and feminist 
advocacy as it does the strategic benefits and costs of ever-shifting 
alliances.  
In the twenty-first century, a new form of maternalism has emerged 
that reinforces gender inequality even as it calls for public entitlements 
related to mothering. Naomi Mezey and Nina Pillard identify a cultural 
trend “toward a maternalism that powerfully reinvigorates the links 
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between women, parenting, and home care.”337 Internet sites, such as 
MomsRising.org, advocate health benefits, childcare, family leave, and 
work flexibility but also reinforce the cultural construction of motherhood 
as a private activity.
338
 The new maternalism fails to challenge men to 
engage in domestic work,
339
 avoids the term “feminism,” and does not 
acknowledge a political link to second-wave feminist predecessors.
340
 The 
new maternalism illustrates the double-edged sword of maternal politics: 
its potential to reify gender norms even as it uses gender as a category by 
which to make demands upon the state.  
Liberal individualism and maternalism today reinforce both market 
libertarianism and the sexual division of caregiving labor within the 
family. This Article has analyzed how feminists, the business lobby, and 
anti-abortion activists wielded these two legal paradigms in the 1970s in 
ways both strategic and ideological. A richer historical understanding 
helps us to more clearly see the political work that liberal individualist and 
neomaternal discourses perform today. We still struggle as a nation with 
the question whether reproduction represents a private choice and, hence, a 
private economic responsibility or a public good deserving of societal 
support. We continue to wrestle with the question of how men and 
women’s different roles in biological reproduction should inform our 
understanding of sex equality. This Article ultimately shows the limits of 
extant legal paradigms to realize a legal system that distributes the costs of 
reproduction in a manner that both supports families and also destabilizes 
sex-role stereotypes. The Article points toward the need for new legal 
paradigms that reach beyond the constraints of liberal individualism and 
neomaternalism. 
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